Visual Mental Imagery Activates Topographically Organized Visual Cortex: PET Investigations by Kosslyn, Stephen Michael et al.
 




(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Kosslyn, Stephen Michael, Nathaniel M. Alpert, William L.
Thompson, Vera Maljkovic, Steven B. Weise, Christopher F.
Chabris, Sania E. Hamilton, Scott L. Rauch, and Ferdinando S.
Buonanno. 1993. Visual mental imagery activates topographically
organized visual cortex: PET investigations. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience 5(3): 263-287.
Published Version doi:10.1162/jocn.1993.5.3.263
Accessed February 18, 2015 7:20:59 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3626276
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAAVi  Mental Imagery Activates 
Topographically Organized Visual Cortex: 
PET Investigations 
Stephen M. Kosslyn,*t Nathaniel M. Alpert,? William L. Thompson,* 
Vera Maljkovic,* Steven B. Weise,? Christopher F.  Chabris,* Sania E. 
Hamilton,* Scott L. Rauch,? and Ferdinand0 S. Buonanno? 
*Harvard University and TMassachusetts General Hospital 
Abstract 
Cerebral blood flow was measured using positron emission 
tomography (PET)  in  three  experiments while subjects per- 
formed mental imagery or analogous perceptual tasks. In  Ex- 
periment 1, the subjects either visualized letters in grids and 
decided whether an X mark would have fallen on each letter 
if it were actually in the grid, or they saw letters in grids and 
decided whether an X mark fell on each letter. A region iden- 
tified as part of  area 17 by the Talairach and Tournoux (1988) 
atlas, in addition to other areas involved in vision, was activated 
more in  the mental imagery task than in the perception task. 
In  Experiment 2, the  identical stimuli were presented in im- 
agery and baseline conditions, but subjects were asked to form 
images only in the imagery condition; the  portion of  area 17 
that was more active in the imagery condition of  Experiment 
1 was  also  more  activated in  imagery than  in  the  baseline 
condition,  as was part of  area 18. Subjects also were tested with 
degraded perceptual stimuli, which caused visual cortex to be 
activated to  the same degree  in  imagery and perception.  In 
INTRODUCTION 
Visual  perception  occurs  while  a  stimulus  is  being 
viewed, which leads to the creation of  modality-specific 
internal representations; in  contrast, visual  mental im- 
agery occurs when such representations are present but 
the object is no longer being viewed. Visual  mental im- 
ages correspond to short-term memory representations 
that lead to  the experience of  “seeing with  the mind’s 
eye.” Unlike afterimages, the modality-specific represen- 
tations that underlie imagery are relatively prolonged. 
Although imagery has played a central role in theoriz- 
ing about the mind since the time of  Aristotle (e.g., see 
Tye,  1991),  its  nature  and  properties  have  been  sur- 
rounded by  controversy. Indeed, during the Behaviorist 
era, its very existence was questioned (e.g., see Watson, 
1913), and more recently its status as a distinct kind of 
mental representation has been vigorously debated (An- 
derson & Bower, 1973; Kosslyn, 1980; Kosslyn & Pom- 
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both  Experiments 1 and  2, however, imagery selectively acti- 
vated the extreme anterior part of  what was identified as area 
17, which is  inconsistent with the relatively small size of  the 
imaged stimuli. These results, then, suggest that imagery may 
have  activated another region just  anterior to  area  17. In  Ex- 
periment  3, subjects were  instructed to  close their eyes and 
evaluate visual mental images of  upper case letters that were 
formed at  a small size or large size. The small mental images 
engendered more activation in the posterior portion of  visual 
cortex, and the large mental images engendered more activa- 
tion in anterior portions of  visual cortex. This finding is strong 
evidence that imagery activates topographically mapped cortex. 
The activated regions were  also consistent with  their  being 
localized in area 17. Finally, additional results were consistent 
with the existence of  two types of  imagery, one that rests on 
allocating attention to  form  a pattern  and  one that  rests on 
activating stored visual memories. 
erantz, 1977; Pylyshyn,  1973, 1981). The  recent debate 
has focused on the question of  whether visual mental 
images depict information, or whether  they  represent 
information propositionally (and the depictive properties 
of  imagery that are evident to introspection play no func- 
tional role in information processing). In this article we 
report  three positron emission tomography (PET) ex- 
periments in which we investigate whether visual mental 
imagery activates topographically mapped areas of  visual 
cortex. Such a finding would be good evidence that visual 
imagery is a special kind of  visual short-term memory 
representation, one that involves depictive mental rep- 
resentations. 
It has long been known that area 17 (also called pri- 
mary visual cortex) is  topographically organized in hu- 
mans (e.g., see Fox, Mintun, Raichle, Miezin, Allman, L? 
Van  Essen,  1986; Holmes,  1918; Teuber, Battersby, & 
Bender, 1960) and in nonhuman primates (e.g., see Dan- 
iel  & Whitteridge, 1961; Tootell, Silverman, Switkes, & 
Journal of  Cognitive  Neurosc~  53,  pp. 263-287 De Valois,  1982).  Indeed,  neuroanatomical  studies of 
nonhuman primates have revealed that about half of  the 
32 distinct cortical areas known to be involved in vision 
are topographically organized (see Felleman & Van  Es- 
sen, 1991; Van  Essen, 1985). All  of  the relatively “low- 
level” (i.e., early in  the processing sequence) areas of 
cortex are topographically organized. Furthermore, vir- 
tually every area involved in vision (not solely the low- 
level areas) that has an afferent connection to  another 
area also receives an efferent connection from that area, 
and the forward and backward projections are of com- 
parable size (e.g., Van Essen, 1985). These features of  the 
anatomy imply that  a great  deal  of  information  flows 
backward in the system, from “higher-level’’  areas to the 
“lower-level,’’  topographically organized areas. Indeed, 
Douglas and Rockland (1992) have found direct connec- 
tions  from  area TE  (in the  anterior  inferior temporal 
lobe) all  the way  back  to area  17 (see also Rockland, 
Saleem, & Tanaka, 1992). Such direct cortico-cortico con- 
nections from the higher-level areas to the lower-level 
areas are consistent with the hypothesis that visual mental 
images are formed by  using stored information to  re- 
construct  spatial patterns  in  topographically organized 
cortical areas. Similar ideas have been popular at least 
since the late nineteenth century (e.g., see James, 1890). 
Consistent with this hypothesis, numerous researchers 
have shown that parts of  the brain used in vision are also 
involved in visual mental imagery (for reviews, see Farah, 
1988; Kosslyn, in press). Two types of  evidence support 
this inference. First, patients with brain damage some- 
times show deficits in imagery that parallel their deficits 
in perception (see Farah, 1988; Kosslyn & Koenig, 1992). 
For example, patients with unilateral visual  neglect ig- 
nore objects on the same side of  space in both percep- 
tion and mental imagery (e.g., Bisiach & Luzzatti, 1978; 
Bisiach, Luzzatti, & Perani,  1979). Second, researchers 
have  used  a  number  of  techniques  to  measure  brain 
activity while subjects are performing tasks using visual 
mental imagery and have found activation in brain areas 
used in visual perception. For example, Farah, Peronnet, 
Gonon, and  Girard  (1988)  used  evoked  potentials  to 
study visual imagery, and found activity on the posterior 
scalp; Goldenberg, Podreka, Uhl, Steiner, Willmes, Suess, 
and Deecke (1989) used single photon emission com- 
puted tomography (SPECT) and found activation in the 
occipital lobe; and Roland and Friberg (1985) used xe- 
non-133 regional cerebral blood  flow (rCBF) measure- 
ments to  show that  the posterior  part of  the brain  is 
active during visual mental imagery. However, all previ- 
ous research on brain activation during imagery relied 
on methods  that  have much poorer spatial resolution 
than PET.  PET  allows us to investigate the possibility that 
visual mental imagery involves specific cortical areas that 
are known to be topographically organized. In addition, 
PET allows us to test specific predictions about the mech- 
anisms that form visual  mental  images, as will be  de- 
scribed shortly. 
This experiment was based on a task originally devised 
by  Podgorny and Shepard (1978). They  asked subjects 
either to view a letter in a grid (perception) or to imagine 
its presence in an empty grid (imagery). Following this, 
one or more dots were presented, and the subjects were 
to indicate whether the dot(s) fell on or off  the letter (in 
the perception condition) or whether they would have 
fallen on or off  the letter were it  in  the grid (in  the 
imagery condition). Podgorny and Shepard showed that 
the time subjects took to respond varied with such factors 
as the number, and location of  the dots. Furthermore, 
these factors affected response times in the same way  in 
the imagery and perception  conditions, suggesting that 
some of  the same processes are used to  carry out the 
two tasks (see Sternberg, 1969). Thus, we felt justified in 
assuming that a similar perception task could serve as a 
baseline for the analogous imagery task; by  subtracting 
the  blood flow evoked during the perception task, we 
could remove the contribution of  the processes that also 
were used in the imagery task (such as those required 
to register the probe, to determine whether it was on or 
off  a pattern, to generate a response, and to execute that 
response). The fact that the imagery task requires more 
time overall than the perception  task  suggests that  im- 
agery is more difficult than perception under these con- 
ditions; thus,  the subtraction  should  reveal  which-if 
any-areas  are involved in imagery but not perception, 
as well as which shared areas had to  work particularly 
hard during imagery. 
We  were able to  formulate predictions  about which 
brain areas should be particularly active during imagery 
by  using a variant of  the Podgorny  and Shepard  task. 
Kosslyn, Cave, Provost, and Von Gierke (1988) used this 
task to  study how visual mental  images are generated; 
“image generation” is  the  process  whereby  the short- 
term  memory  image  representation  is  formed, which 
requires activating information stored in long-term mem- 
ory. Kosslyn et al. (1988) presented the probe before the 
subjects were  able to  finish visualizing the letter, and 
thereby could study the process of  constructing the im- 
age by examining which portions of  the shape appeared 
in the image before  others  (as indicated  by  faster  re- 
sponses to probes in those parts of  the image). Kosslyn 
et al. (1988) varied the locations of  the probe marks, and 
found that subjects visualize letters a segment at a time, 
in roughly the order in which they would draw them on 
paper. Based on patterns of  dissociations following brain 
damage  in  other  imagery tasks  (e.g., see Farah,  1984; 
Kosslyn & Koenig, 1992) and on computational analyses 
(Kosslyn, 1980; Kosslyn, in  press), we assume that the 
task  has two  major components: Subjects first  activate 
stored information to create an image of  part of  an object, 
and then “inspect” these imagined patterns for specific 
properties (using the same processes as in perception). 
Thus, we can  focus on specific imagery  processes  by 
264  Journal of Cognitive Neumcience  volume 5, Number 3 comparing the blood flow evoked by this version of  the 
task with that evoked  by  the perception  baseline task, 
namely those that are involved in generating visual men- 
tal  images; the  perception  baseline  task  allows  us  to 
remove the blood flow that reflects the inspection of  the 
pattern, leaving the flow that underlies image generation. 
On the basis of  previous theories (see Kosslyn, 1980, 
1987, 1991, in press), we expected the following areas 
to be selectively activated during image generation: top- 
ographically mapped areas of  visual cortex (correspond- 
ing to the “visual buffer”); occipital-temporal junction or 
middle temporal gyrus structures (corresponding to the 
“literal files’’ of  Kosslyn, 1980, which may be the locus 
of  visual memories in humans; see Haxby, Grady, Hor- 
witz, Ungerleider, Mishkin, Carson, Herscovitch, Shapiro, 
& Rapoport, 1991; Sergent, Ohta, & Macdonald, 1992); 
dorsolateral prefrontal lobe structures (corresponding to 
the process that arranges parts into an image); superior 
parietal lobe structures (e.g., area 7, which are involved 
in shifting attention to the locations of  successive seg- 
ments  as they  are placed  in  the  image, see Corbetta, 
Miezin, Shulman, & Petersen, 1993; Haxby et  al., 1991); 
and the pulvinar and anterior cingulate (which  appar- 
ently are involved in fixating visual attention, as required 
to note where parts belong on the emerging structure; 
see LaBerge  & Buchsbaum,  1990; Posner  & Petersen, 
1990). These  last attentional  structures are involved in 
the “engage” operation; we expect them to be selectively 
activated during imagery because one does not need to 
engage attention  until  finding the target  during a per- 
ceptual task, but must engage attention for each segment 
when  building  the image up from  scratch. Finally,  we 
also expect inferior parietal lobe activation when subjects 
encode the spatial relation  of  the X and the figure, as 
well as the individual spatial relations among segments 
of  the figure (see Kosslyn, 1987); but such activity should 
occur in both tasks, and hence should not be in evidence 
after the subtraction. 
Two groups of  men were tested. Subjects in one group 
received imagery trials. They began by studying a set of 
uppercase and lowercase block letters; the opposite-case 
letter in a script font was centered beneath each letter. 
After  studying these  letters, the subjects participated  in 
the task itself: They saw grids that contained only an X 
mark (formed by  connecting the diagonal corners of  a 
grid cell) and had a script cue beneath  them, as illus- 
trated in  Figure 1. They were asked to  decide whether 
the  block  letter  that  corresponded  to  the  cue would 
cover the X, were the letter in the  grid as it had previ- 
ously appeared. This task required the subjects to visu- 
alize the letter in the grid. Half  of  the X marks would 
have  been  on the figure  (“yes” trials)  and half  would 
have been adjacent to the figure (“no”  trials). Moreover, 
half  of  each  type  of  trial  were placed  on or  near  a 
segment that  typically is  drawn  early  in  the sequence 
(“early” trials), and half were placed on or near a seg- 
ment that typically is drawn late in the sequence (“late” 
1  Perception  Imagery  Sensory-Motor 
Control 
i?  i? 
Figure 1. Stimuli used in Experiment 1. Subjects either saw a letter 
in a grid (perception task), visualized the letter (imagery task), or 
waited for the  X mark to  be removed (sensory-motor task). 
trials). The subjects pressed one pedal with their right 
foot to  indicate “yes” and another pedal with their left 
foot  to  indicate  “no,” and were urged  to  respond  as 
quickly and accurately as possible. 
Following this, the imagery group received the per- 
ception baseline task. This task was like the imagery task, 
except that the block letters were actually present in the 
grids (drawn in light gray), as illustrated in Figure 1. The 
subjects  were  to  decide  as quickly  and accurately  as 
possible whether the X  mark was on or off  the letter. 
Thus, although the subjects did not need to visualize the 
letter, they  still had to  encode the X  mark, make the 
judgment, and produce the response. The imagery and 
perception tasks used identical sequences of  letters and 
probe positions; because the tasks involved at least 250 
trials  it was  unlikely that  subjects  could have  remem- 
bered the sequences of  responses (or even realized that 
the order was the same). 
The other half of  the subjects were tested in a sensory- 
motor control  task, which allowed us to  examine  the 
effects of  simply observing an empty grid and respond- 
ing; we wanted to ensure that any differences between 
the  imagery and perception  tasks  were not  merely  a 
consequence of  encoding higher spatial frequencies or 
scanning  more high-contrast  lines  when  empty  grids 
were  present.  The  sensory-motor  control  trials  were 
identical to the imagery trials except that the cue beneath 
the grid was eliminated and the X  mark was removed 
after a variable amount of  time. The delay was imposed 
to ensure that the subjects in the sensory-motor control 
task viewed the grid as long as the subjects in the imagery 
task, and a range of  delays was used to ensure that they 
actively  monitored  the  display  without  falling  into  a 
rhythm of  responding after a fixed interval. The subjects 
looked  at the  grid  until  the X  mark  was  removed,. at 
which point they pressed a pedal and the stimulus was 
removed (the pedal to  be pressed alternated from trial 
to  trial). Following this task, these subjects performed 
the perception baseline task exactly as described above. 
Subjects were given the instructions for both tasks (the 
Km&n etal.  265 imagery and perception baseline or the sensory-motor 
control  and perception  baseline) before  entering the 
scanner, and the instructions for the perception baseline 
task were  repeated prior to  that task.  The perception 
baseline task  was  administered approximately 10 min 
after the conclusion of  the first task. 
Results 
We analyzed the response times from the imagery and 
perception tasks  in  order to  confirm that the subjects 
were in  fact generating visual mental images, and then 
considered the PET  results themselves. 
Behavioral results 
Replicating previous results (Kosslyn  et al., 1988), sub- 
jects who performed the imagery task required less time 
to evaluate the “early”  probes than the “late”  probes (with 
means of 3294 and 3635 msec, respectively), t(6) = 3.75, 
p < 0.01; in contrast, there was no difference in the error 
rates for the cwo  kinds of  probes (19.2 versus 22%),p > 
0.25. Given thatkosslyn et al. (1988) found that the effect 
of  probe location only occurred when imagery was used, 
these  findings provide evidence that  the  subjects did 
follow the instructions and used imagery in this task; the 
effect of  probe position appears to represent the dynam- 
ics of  the image construction process itself. As has been 
found in previous studies (e.g., Kosslyn, 1988; Kosslyn et 
al., 1988), there was  no effect of  probe location in the 
perceptual baseline task for either group, t < 1 for the 
earlyllate comparison in each case (with mean response 
times of  814 and 774 msec for the “early”  probes for the 
two groups, and 844 and 732 msec for the “late”  probes 
for the two groups; the corresponding error rates were 
2.2,2.0,2.7,  and 3.9%).  These findings gave us confidence 
that the blood flow patterns evoked during the imagery 
task do in fact reflect imagery processing. 
PET Results 
Data from the imagery and sensory-motor  control groups 
were prepared for statistical analysis by defining circular, 
20-mm-diameter regions of  interest  (ROIs)  on  trans- 
formed, interpolated cerebral blood  flow  (CBF)  maps 
(see the Method  section, at the end of  the article). The 
ROIs were located over 15 areas; as noted above, some 
of  these regions were hypothesized to be used in im- 
agery and perception (see Kosslyn, 1991), and we took 
most seriously the analyses of  these regions. However, 
we also analyzed other regions that appeared to be the 
sites of  large amounts of  activation. These ROIs  were 
localized using a computerized version of  the Talairach 
brain atlas (Talairach, Szikla, Tournoux, Prossalentis,  Bor- 
das-Ferrer, Covello, Iacob, & Mempel, 1967), which su- 
perimposed atlas structures on the  transformed mean 
CBF and difference images (for details, see the Method 
section). 
Statistical analyses were performed using the SAS sys- 
tem, Version 5. The  dependent variable was the percent 
relative difference (PRD)  in  CBF,  computed  as 200  X 
[(CBK -  meanl) -  (CBK -  meanz)]  / (meanl + mean*>, 
where subscript 1 refers to the  imagery measurement 
for the imagery group and the sensory-motor control 
measurement for the control group, and subscript 2 re- 
fers to  the perception baseline measurement fqr both 
groups. Data were classified according to subject, group, 
task, ROI, and “Z” distance above or below the anterior 
commissure-posterior commissure (AC-PC)  line. 
Most  ROIs  had an axial extent encompassing several 
4-mm-thick interpolated planes in stereotactic space. Ac- 
cordingly, the number of  PRD values was reduced to one 
per ROI by averaging each ROI over its Z-distance range, 
creating a data set with 14 (subjects) X  15 ROIs; however, 
one  subject  had  a  missing  region  (due  to  the  way 
the camera was  positioned). These data were analyzed 
with  a  linear  model  of  the  form  PRD  = 
TASK  + SLJBJECTS(TASK) + ROI + TASKXROI, using the 
GLM  procedure of  SAS, where SUBJECT(TASK) indicates 
subjects nested within task and TASKXROI  indicates an 
interaction term. The null hypothesis is  PRD=O  for all 
ROIs. The overallF(43,179) = 3.59,p = 0.0001, indicated 
that there were significant differences among the ROIs. 
The pooled mean PRD  was 2.66%, with MSE  = 6.24. All 
main  effects were significant at  the p = 0.01 level  or 
better, but the interaction of  TASK  and ROI was not,p = 
0.22. A Kolomogorov D test showed that the residuals 
were distributed normally. 
We next analyzed the data from the two groups sepa- 
rately. The effect of  region was highly significant, F(15, 
89) = 2.62,~  = 0.0026, for the imagery group, but was 
not  significant, F  < 1, for  the sensory-motor control 
group. The hypothesis that  specific brain  regions are 
relatively more active during the imagery task than dur- 
ing the perception task was tested by computing the least 
square means and their associated p values; this statistic 
allowed  us  to  determine  whether  a  given  value  was 
greater than what would be expected by chance. 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the critical PET  findings for 
the imagery and perception tasks. The most interesting 
finding is  that  an area identified  as area  17 was  more 
active  during  imagery  than  during  perception, p  = 
0.0005. The area of  activation was not a point, but rather 
an elongated volume whose second moments indicate a 
parallelopiped with the following coordinates (in mm): 
+1.5< X  < 8.4, -75.45  < Y < -53.2,  and -0.2<  Z < 
16.2. The X coordinates are relative to the midline along 
the horizontal axis; the Y  coordinates are relative to the 
anterior commissure (AC)  along the anterior-posterior 
axis; and the 2 coordinates are relative to the AC-PC  line 
along the vertical axis. Although the region of activation 
is  rather  large, the  coronal  plate  illustrating  regions 
266  JournaL of Cognitive Neuroscience  Volume 5, Number 3 Figure 2.  Transverse slices of  averaged blood flow data from the three experiments,  as seen from the bottom looking up. The lower part of  each 
slice is the back of the brain, and the left side represents the right hemisphere and the right side represents the left  hemisphere. The height above 
the ACPC line is identified for each slice or set of  slices. The top left panel presents key results from Experiment 1, with results from the imagery 
group on the left and from the sensory-motor control group on the right. IMG, imagery; SMC, sensory-motor  control; PER,  perception; VC, visual 
cortex. The bottom center panel presents key results from Experiment 2; the top row is imagery-perception,  the middle row is  imagery-baseline,  and 
the bonom row is perception-baseline.  The slices in each column are the same height above the AGPC line, as indicated. MT,  middle temporal 
gyrus;  DPF, dorsolateral prefrontal; THAL,  thalamus;  VC, visual cortex; HP, hippocampus; 19, area 19  AN, angular gyius; 18, area 18; CAUD, caudate; 
IP, inferior parietal; SP, superior parietal. The top right panel presents key results from Experiment 3, when activation engendered by large images is 
subtracted from that engendered by  small images and vice versa. POST 17, posterior area 17;  ANT 17, anterior area 17. 
Koslynetal.  267 Figure 3.  Results from Exper- 
iment 1. The  left  and right ce- 
rebral hemispheres, seen from 
lateral and medial views. The 
triangles represent the loci of 
significant increases in activity 
in  the imagery task relative to 
the perception task;  the circles 
represent the loci of  significant 
increases in activity in  the sen- 
sory-motor control task relative 
to  the perception task. The tick 
marks on the axes specify 20 
mm increments relative to  the 
anterior commissure. 
LATERAL VIEW 
A  IMAGERY minus PERCEPTION 
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-65  mm  posterior to AC of  the 1988 Talairach atlas (see 
page  77  of  Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) illustrates the 
location  of  the centroid of  activation-at  8 mm  above 
the AC-PC line, the activation is exactly on the infolding 
of  area  17. However, we must  note that the activated 
region is close to the boundary between areas 17, 18, 
and 30. This region was  no more activated during the 
sensory-motor task than during the perception baseline 
task, p = 0.839. Thus, it  is not merely observing grids 
with X marks that produces the additional activation we 
found in the imagery task relative to the perception task; 
one must also be forming a visual mental image in the 
grid. 
To  better understand the locus of  activation in visual 
cortex, we manually outlined the activated region within 
this structure to create a volume of  interest. The  geo- 
metric centroid of  the activated region was  located to 
the left of  midline, with coordinates X = -3.5  mm, Y = 
64.3 mm, and 2 = 8.0 mm, and its extent along the three 
dimensions was estimated (from its second moments) to 
be X = 9.7 mm, Y = 22.3 mm, and 2 = 16.5 mm. To 
discover whether this apparent bias toward the left  side 
was  significant, we created an homologous volume that 
was oriented to the right of  the midline. We examined 
the  results  for  each  subject, comparing the  left-right 
difference in the amount of  imagery activation (after the 
perception activation was  subtracted) in each volume, 
and found that there was indeed more activation on the 
left  side (p < 0.01). This post  hoc analysis provides 
evidence that  in  this  task  imagery selectively activates 
visual cortex in the left cerebral hemisphere. This finding 
also  converges  with  behavioral  results,  which  have 
shown that subjects can perform this imagery task faster 
when the stimuli are presented in the right visual field, 
and hence are seen initially in the left hemisphere (Kos- 
slyn,  1988; Kosslyn,  Maljkovic,  Hamilton,  Horwitz,  & 
Thompson, 1993). 
A number of  other areas were also activated in  the 
imagery task, as illustrated in Figure 3 and summarized 
in Table 1. Notably, we found that the anterior cingulate 
and the left  pulvinar were selectively active during im- 
agery, relative to perception. The thalamus was visualized 
on four slices in the stereotactic coordinate system (Z = 
-4,  0, 4, and 8 mm from the AC-PC line); we identified 
the  pulvinar  as the  posterior  portions of  the  inferior 
aspect (2 = -4  and 0 mm), and considered the regions 
to the left  and right of  the midline separately. We also 
found that a region of  dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was 
activated in both the left and right hemispheres. We did 
not, however, find  activation of  the  occipital-temporal 
junction areas,p > 0.17 in each case. Finally, we found 
activation in the posterior cingulate and the cuneus, re- 
sults that were not expected and cannot be explained 
easily at this time. 
In contrast, only one area showed significantly more 
activation in the sensory-motor control task than in the 
perceptual control task, namely the cuneus, p = 0.0017, 
which is not easily explained. Of the areas we had reason 
to  examine, no others approached significance in  the 
analysis of  the sensory-motor data,p > 0.17 in all cases. 
Discussion 
The most striking aspect of  our results is that we found 
greuter activation of  visual cortex during image genera- 
tion  than  during  perception.  Furthermore,  we  found 
such activation only when subjects formed images; when 
they viewed  the same grids stimuli but  did  not  form 
268  Journal of  Cognitive Neuroscience  volume 5,  Number 3 Table 1.  Coordinates (in mm, Relative to the Anterior Commissure) andp Values for Regions in Which There Was More 
Activation during Imagery Than Perception in Experiment 1” 
Y  Z  P  X 
MUline 
Area  17  -0.8  -64.8  12.0  0.0005 
Cuneus  -0.6  -64.4  20.0  0.0004 
Posterior cingulate  1.5  -  19.9  32.0  0.04 
Anterior cingulate  2.1  23.3  28.0  0.0001 
Lefi  hem@bere regions 
Pulvinar 
Dorsolateral prefrontal 




0.0  0.01 
12.0  0.0075 
Right hemi@h  regions 
Dorsolateral prefrontal  43.8  11.6  12.0  0.0001 
“Regions are presented from posterior to anterior. Midline regions lie in the saggital aspect of  the brain; some left hemisphere regions are on the 
lateral surface, and some are medial,  as illustrated in Figure 3. Seen  from the rear of the head, the X  coordinate is horizontal (with positive values 
to the right), the Y  coordinate is in depth (with positive values anterior to the anterior commissure), and the Z  coordinate is vertical (with positive 
values superior to the anterior commissure). 
images, visual cortex was not activated more than during 
the perception task. However, although the Talairach at- 
las identified the centroid as falling within the confines 
of  area  17, the activation was  at  the extreme anterior 
portion of  this region. Although the atlas shows area 17 
extending as far anterior as -60  mm (relative to the AC), 
the centroid was close to the boundaries of  areas 17, 18, 
and 30. The visual field is  mapped along the calcarine 
fissure, with the fovea at the posterior end and regions 
subtending about 85” reaching the anterior end. Thus, 
the  purported  location of  the  centroid  in  area  17 is 
unexpected given the relatively small visual angle of  the 
stimuli, and casts doubt on the inference that area  17 
was  activated. Nevertheless, in the monkey all portions 
of  visual cortex that abut area 17 are also topographically 
mapped, and hence it  is  likely that whatever area was 
activated by imagery, it is topographically organized (we 
will consider this issue in more detail in Experiment 3). 
We label this area “VC” (for “visual cortex”) in Figure 2 
to express our agnosticism about the identity of  the area, 
and wish to emphasize that we present labels merely for 
expository convenience: the critical aspect of  the results 
is the coordinates of the activated regions, not the names 
they are presently assigned. 
In addition, the PET  images indicated that imagery and 
perception activate similar areas, as we expected if  the 
tasks  did in  fact  involve common processes; however, 
some of  these processes had  to  work  harder  during 
image generation than  during perception or image in- 
spection. The fact  that not all of  the areas were more 
active during image generation than during perception 
suggests that the results do not reflect an overall effect 
of  difficulty per se; increased difficulty would presumably 
raise the overall level of activation, but would not selec- 
tively affect some structures relative to others. 
But why did imagery result in more activation of  visual 
cortex than did perception?  The increased activation dur- 
ing imagery may  have  occurred because visual cortex 
receives high resolution information during “bottom up” 
perception, enabling its edge-detection and region-or- 
ganizing processes to  operate  relatively  effectively. In 
contrast, one must  recreate  the  pattern  from  remem- 
bered information that is typically incomplete (cf. Neis- 
ser, 1967) during imagery-and  so the processes used 
to  reconstruct the local geometry of  objects in  visual 
cortex may  be forced to  work harder. We  investigated 
this idea in Experiment 2. 
We can also understand the fact that the anterior cin- 
gulate and the left pulvinar were selectively active during 
imagery. These areas appear to be involved in attention 
(see Merge & Buchsbaum, 1990; Posner, 1988; Posner 
& Petersen, 1990), and our imagery task requires “tag- 
ging” specific cells of  the grid to form an image (Pod- 
gorny & Shepard, 1978, also conceived of  this  image 
generation process as involving selective attention). We 
expected these areas to be activated as part of  the image 
generation process, given that people must “look at the 
location where each additional part belongs (see Kosslyn, 
1980). It is worth noting, however, that the greater acti- 
vation of  the anterior cingulate probably does not indi- 
cate that  it  was  more  active in  response  selection or 
decision making in general, although it could be more 
active only when prefrontal areas are involved in pro- 
cessing (cf. Corbetta, Miezin, Dobmeyer, Shulman, & Pe- 
tersen, 1991); not only did the imagery and perception 
tasks involve the same responses, but the subjects actually 
made more of  these responses in the perception  task 
(because they required less time per trial, and the trials 
were self-paced). Even if the subjects had made the same 
number of  responses in  both tasks, we would not have 
expected greater activation during imagery if the anterior 
cingulate plays a critical role in response preparation or 
selection in general. 
In addition, we were intrigued by our finding of  im- 
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atlas identifies as “Broca’s area,” as well as the fact that 
activation  was  also  present  in  the  homologous right 
hemisphere regions. Because both  hemispheres were 
activated, the subjects were probably not merely subvo- 
calizing to  themselves during  the  task.  Instead, these 
regions may be involved in programming sequences of 
operations, such as those required to build up an image 
a segment at  a  time  (see  Kosslyn, 1987, 1988, 1991). 
Activation was  also present in the nearby area 46; the 
homologous area in monkeys has been shown to serve 
as a spatial memory (see Goldman-Rakic, 1987), which 
would provide critical information for constructing the 
image a segment at a time. These findings are consistent 
with Shepard’s (1987) idea that linguistic processing in 
Broca’s  area  evolved out  of  earlier visual-spatial pro- 
cesses that were implemented in this region. 
Finally, we were  initially surprised that imagery did 
not  selectively activate the  occipital-temporal junction 
area or the middle temporal gyrus, given the results of 
Haxby  et  al. (1991) and Sergent et  al. (1992). We ex- 
pected such activation because these regions may  con- 
stitute the human analog of  the inferior temporal lobe 
in monkeys, which is involved in storing visual memories 
(cf. Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982). However, as noted 
above, Podgorny and Shepard (1978) conceived of  their 
task as requiring attention, not activation of  visual mem- 
ories. And  based on observations of  selective deficits in 
patients with  different types  of  brain  damage, Levine, 
Warach, and Farah (1985) argued that there are two types 
of imagery-one that involves activating  visual memories, 
and one that involves allocating attention. For example, 
if one stares at a tile floor and “sees”  patterns by attending 
to different combinations of tiles, one is using attention- 
based imagery. This sort of  imagery involves “marking” 
regions of  a spatially organized structure (the  “visual 
buffer”)  that have been attended to, as opposed to acti- 
vating stored memories of  patterns. A stored description 
of the locations of  segments, not a visual memory, can 
be used to direct attention to  each of  the appropriate 
locations (see Kosslyn, 1987, 1991). 
The two kinds of  imagery may involve the same mech- 
anisms, except that during attentional imagery attention 
is  allocated selectively and temporal-lobe-based visual 
memories are not activated (for additional discussion of 
this distinction, see Kosslyn  & Shin, in press). Our grid- 
and-X task involves this sort of  attentional imagery, and 
hence in retrospect it is  not surprising that visual mem- 
o’y areas in the temporal lobe were not activated in this 
task. This hypothesis might also explain why we did not 
find greater activation in parietal regions during imagery. 
Posner and his colleagues (e.g., Posner & Petersen, 1990) 
posit that the parietal lobes are involved in (among other 
functions) disengaging attention from a region prior to 
shifting one’s attention to a new region. This process 
would not occur in attention-based imagery: One would 
leave one’s attention engaged in each successive area, 
building up the segments of  the imaged pattern. In con- 
trast, the superior parietal lobes should be active when 
one uses visual-memory-based  imagery; in this case, one 
visualizes an object or part and then must disengage to 
shift  to  the  location  at  which  another  object  or part 
should be imaged. We  investigate these possibilities in 
the following experiment. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Perhaps the most striking finding of  Experiment 1 is that 
imagery induced more activation in  visual  cortex than 
did perception. This may have occurred because images 
are not stored as photographs, but rather must be actively 
reconstructed. Such a reconstruction process may  also 
take place in perception itself under some circumstances. 
For  example, Lowe  (1987a,b)  found  that  when  con- 
fronted with  noisy  visual  input,  it  was  useful  for  his 
computer vision program to generate template-like im- 
ages and match them top-down against fragmentary in- 
put. Lowe’s program essentially used mental imagery to 
help encode noisy inputs during perception. Kosslyn (in 
press) argues that human imagery is used in a similar 
way during perception. 
We investigated this hypothesis by  modifying the per- 
ception stimuli used in Experiment 1: We now first pre- 
sented a script cue and then presented  a perceptually 
degraded upper case  version of  the cued  letter and a 
degraded X  mark. Although the subjects were told  to 
compare the visible letter and X mark, we hypothesized 
that in this task they would use imagery to complete the 
noisy input. If  so, then topographically organized visual 
cortex should be activated to a similar degree in imagery 
and perception. 
We did not want to be in the position of  predicting a 
null finding, however, and thus included another con- 
dition to demonstrate that visual cortex was activated in 
the imagery task. In this new baseline task the subjects 
viewed the exact same grids stimuli used in the imagery 
task, but did not form images in them. 
Finally, we designed this experiment so that we could 
explore the hypothesis that regions of  the temporal lobe 
and the inferior parietal lobe were not activated in  Ex- 
periment 1 because those subjects used “attention-based 
imagery.” In  this experiment, all test stimuli now were 
presented for only 200 msec. We hypothesized that re- 
moving the stimulus quickly would make it difficult for 
the subject to  allocate attention systematically over the 
grid. Thus, we conjectured that the subjects would recall 
what the pattern actually looked like, using visual-mem- 
ory-based imagery, instead of  recalling a description of 
which rows and columns had been  filled and then di- 
recting attention to those regions. In addition, we were 
concerned that the imagery results from Experiment 1 
could have arisen because the subjects moved their eyes 
differently in  the  imagery and  sensory motor  control 
tasks; perhaps the activation in visual cortex was caused 
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across the grid lines in  the imagery task. The  present 
experimental design eliminates that possibility. 
In  short, our second experiment is like the first but 
with  three changes: First, the perceptual stimuli were 
degraded by  flipping bits randomly within the grid (as 
described in the Method section at the end of  the article). 
Thus, the  figure was  more difficult to  distinguish from 
the background. We  also removed pixels  from the X 
probe mark, making it more difficult to detect. An ex- 
ample of  the stimuli is presented in Figure 4. In contrast, 
as is  evident in  Figure 4, the imagery stimuli did not 
have a noisy background. Second, the fixation point (an 
asterisk) was now replaced by the script cue (which was 
visible for 300 msec). Thus, subjects did  not  have  to 
locate the cue under the grid and shift their attention up 
to form the image. The cue was  presented in both the 
imagery and perception tasks. And  third, all grid stimuli 
now  were presented  for only 200 msec, thereby pre- 
venting the subjects from moving their  eyes over the 
stimuli. Finally, in addition to an imagery and perception 
task, we included a new baseline task. In this set of  trials, 
the subjects received the same trial sequence and stimuli 
that were used in the imagery task; they fixated, saw a 
script cue, and then saw an empty grid with an X mark 
for 200 msec. The task was simply to press a pedal when 
the X mark appeared. This task was  administered first, 
and all of  the subjects who received it reported later that 
they did not form images. Thus, by subtracting the acti- 
vation engendered in this baseline task from that engen- 
dered  in  the  imagery  task,  we  could  assess  the 
contribution of  imagery per se (but not above and be- 
yond that engendered in perception). 
Imagery and  Baseline 
(brw Oxporun) 
*+ &+  +  response 
SOOmuco  9oomaoc8  200 msocr 
Percept  ion 
(W  oxporun) 
SOOmvcr  3Wmrrcr  200 mrcr 
Figure 4.  Stimuli and trial sequences used in Experiment 2 
Our predictions were as follows: If subjects use im- 
agery in  the  new version of  the  perception  task, we 
should now eliminate the difference between the imag- 
ery and perception tasks in the amount of  activation in 
visual cortex-but  we should still find greater activation 
of  this structure during imagery compared to the base- 
line task. In addition, because the stimuli were presented 
briefly, we hypothesized that subjects would not be able 
to attend to the locations of  segments of  the letter very 
easily, and instead would form visual-memory-based im- 
ages. If  so, then we expected temporal lobe  structures 
(used to store and activate visual memories) and parietal 
lobe structures (used to  disengage attention after each 
segment is placed) to be activated selectively in the im- 
agery task. As  in Experiment 1, we expected dorsolateral 
prefrontal areas to be activated, if they in fact play a role 
in arranging parts in an image. 
Results 
Behavioral Results 
The  response times and error rates were analyzed in 
separate analyses of  variance; only the  time  to  make 
correct  responses  was  analyzed,  and  response  times 
greater than 2.5 times the mean of  the appropriate cell 
were treated as outliers and discarded prior to analysis. 
We found that the subjects did not require less time to 
evaluate the “early” probes than the ‘‘late’’  probes in the 
imagery task (with means of  1161  and  1139 msec for 
“early” and “late” probes, respectively), F C  1. Nor did 
we find such an effect in the perception task (with means 
of 668 and 682 msec), F < 1, but the subjects required 
generally  more  time  in  the  imagery  task  than  in  the 
perception task, F(1, 12) = 9.23,p = 0.01. However, they 
did make fewer errors for “early” probes than for the 
“late” probes in  the imagery task (11.8 versus 17.2%), 
F(1, 12) = 9.89,~  < 0.01, and in the perception task 
(10.6 versus  14.7%),  F(1,  12) = 5.93, p  C  0.05. Our 
manipulation of  the letters not only made the perception 
task more difficult (indeed, there was no significant dif- 
ference in error rates between the two tasks, F C l),  but 
also produced an effect of  probe position; this is the first 
time we have found such an effect in a perceptual version 
of  this task (see Kosslyn  et  al., 1988; Kosslyn, 1988)- 
which is consistent with the hypothesis that by degrading 
the stimuli we succeeded in leading the subjects to  use 
imagery in this version of  the perception task. 
PET Results 
We  performed three sets of  analyses on the PET  data: we 
compared imagery and perception by subtracting blood 
flow in the perception task from that in the imagery task; 
we examined imagery per se by subtracting blood flow 
in the baseline task from that in the imagery task; and, 
finally, we examined the perception task per se by sub- 
tracting blood flow in the baseline task from that in the 
KosrEyn etal,  271 perception task. Selected aspects of  the blood  flow re- 
sults are presented in Figure 2. 
Imugey-Perception  Anulysis.  These  results  are pre- 
sented in Table 2, which includes significance levels, and 
Figures 2 and 5. As expected, in contrast to the results 
from Experiment 1,  we now failed to find more activation 
in imagery than in perception in the region identified as 
area 17 by the Talairach atlas,p > 0.13. However, we did 
find more activation in imagery than in perception in a 
number of  areas. First, three areas that were active may 
be involved  in  the storage of,  or  activation of, visual 
memories. We  found more activation in the left middle 
temporal gyrus. Sergent et al., (1992) found the middle 
temporal gyrus to be activated during object recognition 
and  face  recognition; similarly, in  recently  completed 
work  at  the  Massachusetts  General  Hospital we have 
found this area to be active when people decide whether 
words  spoken  name  accompanying  pictures  (Kosslyn, 
Alpert, Thompson, Chabris, Rauch & Anderson, 1993). In 
addition, we found more activation in imagery than in 
perception in the left inferior temporal gyrus; this area 
may  have  a  direct  correspondence  to  area  IT  of  the 
monkey brain, which is known to be involved in encod- 
ing object properties  (e.g., see Ungerleider & Mishkin, 
1982). We also found more activation in the left area 19, 
a visual association area. Consistent with the hypothesis 
that we are now observing the effects of  visual-memory 
based imagery, as opposed to  attention-based imagery, 
we did not find more activation in the thalamus,p > 0.1, 
in contrast to Experiment 1. 
As in  Experiment  1, we found greater activation  in 
imagery than  in  perception  in  several  areas  that  may 
be involved in looking up stored visual information to 
construct an  image. Specifically, dorsolateral  prefrontal 
cortex in both hemispheres (including area 46) was ac- 
tivated, as was the anterior cingulate gyrus. 
As predicted, we now found activation in another set 
of  areas that may be involved in the process of  arranging 
segments of  an image into a composite. Specifically, we 
found more activation in the frontal eye fields, the left 
inferior parietal area, left superior parietal lobe, the right 
superior parietal lobe, and the right angular gyrus. 
We also found activation in two  areas that are known 
to be involved in motor processing, the left precentral 
gyrus and the right  supplementary  motor  area. These 
results were not predicted, but were significant even with 
the  stringent  post  hoc  statistical parametric  mapping 
(SPM)  technique used here (see the Method section at 
the end). 
Finally, for a number of  areas, the difference in acti- 
vation between imagery and perception would have been 
considered to be significant according to our SPM anal- 
ysis  if our theory had predicted these differences. We  list 
these results for the use of  other investigators, who may 
have different theories than ours. These areas (followed 
by X,  Y,  Z  coordinates, ordered from posterior-to-ante- 
rior)  included  the  left-hemisphere  fusiform  gyrus 
(-46.54,  -46.29,  -16.00),  insula (-29.96,  20.01, 8.00), 
and inferior frontal gyrus (-40.16,  25.11, -4.00);  in ad- 
dition, right-hemisphere area 19 (21.04, -67.96,  36.00), 
area  18 (10.84,  -59.04,  4.00), superior temporal  lobe 
(46.54, 3.44, O.OO),  and the inferior frontal gyrus (45.26, 
25.11, -4.00). 
Table 2.  Coordinates (in mm, Relative to the Anterior Commissure) andp Values for Regions in Which There Was More 
Activation during Imagery Than Perception in Experiment 2a 
Y  Z  P 
Anterior cingulate  4.46  23.84  20.00  0.02 
X 
Midline regions 
Frontal eye fields  1.91  17.46  48.00  0.0005 
LeJ  bemisphwe regions 
Superior parietal  -26.14  -73.06  40.00  0.0004 
Area  19  -  28.69  -65.41  36.00  0.005 
Inferior parietal  -28.69  -64.14  40.00  0.0005 
Middle temporal gyrus  -  56.74  -38.64  0.00  0.005 
Inferior temporal  -52.91  -37.36  -  12.00  0.04 
Dorsolateral prefrontal  -41.44  13.64  28.00  0.002 
Precentral gyrus  -41.44  2.16  28.00  0.01 
Right hem&!~bere  regions 
Angular gyrus  23.59  -67.96  28.00  0.05 
Superior parietal  22.31  -61.59  40.00  0.0004 
Supplementary motor area  10.84  4.71  56.00  0.01 
Dorsolateral prefrontal  47.81  18.74  28.00  0.02 
ORegions  are presented from  posterior to  anterior. Midline regions lie in  the saggital aspect of  the brain; some lateralized regions are on the 
lateral surface, and some are medial, as illustrated in Figure 5. Seen from the rear of the head, the X  coordinate is horizontal (with positive values 
to  the right), the Y coordinate is  in depth (with positive values anterior to the anterior commissure), and the 2  coordinate is vertical (with positive 
values superior to  the  anterior commissure). 
272  Journal of Cognitive Nmmcience  Volume 5, Number 3 Figure 5.  Results from Exper- 
iment 2. The left  and right ce- 
rebral hemispheres, seen from 
lateral and medial views. The 
triangles represent the loci of 
significant increases in activity 
in the imagery task relative to 
the perception task. The tick 
marks on the axes specify 20 
mm  increments relative to the 
anterior commissure. 




boJ  A IMAGERY minus PERCEPTION 
Figure 6. Results from Exper- 
iment 2. The left and right ce- 
rebral hemispheres, seen from 
lateral and medial views. The 
triangles represent the loci of 
significant increases in activity 
in the imagery task relative to 
the baseline task, and the cir- 
cles represent the loci of  signif- 
icant increases in activity in the 
perception task relative to the 
baseline task. The tick marks 
on the axes specify 20 mm in- 




Imugery-Baseline  Anulysis.  We  next  examined which 
areas were activated by  imagery per se, not whether it 
activated these structures more than did the perception 
task. To do so, we compared the amount of activation in 
this area when the blood flow evoked in  the baseline 
task was subtracted from that evoked in the imagery task. 
These results are presented in Figures 2 and 6 and Table 
3. As is evident, we did find that the region identified as 
area 17 in the Talairach atlas was more activated during 
imagery than during the baseline task. The coordinates 
of  this area are remarkably similar to those of  the part 
of  visual cortex that was activated by imagery in Experi- 
ment 1. However, this part of  area 17  is very near the 
border of  areas 17, 18, and 30, and we cannot localize 
the activation with confidence to one of  these areas. We 
also found that another region of  cortex, area 18, was 
highly activated during imagery, relative to the baseline 
task. Indeed, this area was so activated that it was signif- 
LATERAL VIEW 
4J  A IMAGERY minus BASELINE  4J 
*l  0  PERCEPTION minus BASELINE 
-60’ 
MEDIAL VIEW 
Kosslyn etal.  273 Table 3.  Coordinates (in mm, Relative to the Anterior Commissure) andp Values for Regions in Which There Was  More 
Activation during Imagery Than in the Baseline Task in Experiment 2" 
X  Y  Z  P 
Midline regions 
Precuneus 
Frontal eye fields 
Superior parietal 
Inferior parietal 
Area  18 
Angular gyrus 




Right hem@bere regions 
Angular gym 
Superior parietal 
Middle temporal gyrus 














































































"Regions are presented kom posterior  to  anterior. Midline  regions lie in  the saggital  aspect of the  brain; some lateralized regions are on the 
lateral  surface, and some are medial, as illustrated in Figure 6.  Seen from the rear of the head, the X  coordinate is horizontal (with positive values 
to  the right), the Y  coordinate is in depth (with positive values anterior to  the anterior commissure), and the Z coordinate is vertical (with positive 
values superior to  the anterior commissure). 
icant even with the stringent SPM post hoc test. This area 
is almost certainly topographically mapped in humans. 
As in the previous analysis,  we found activation in areas 
that may be involved in the storage of, or activation of, 
visual  memories. We found more activation in  the left 
and right middle temporal gyri, in the left inferior tem- 
poral gyrus, and in visual association area 19  in the right 
hemisphere. Unlike the previous analysis, we did find 
activation in the right thalamus, but not the pulvinar per 
se. This  activation may  reflect  image  inspection  pro- 
cesses, which were not eliminated by  this subtraction 
(but were eliminated by subtracting the perception data 
from the imagery data, as explained when we introduced 
the rationale for that subtraction).  These findings contrast 
with those from Experiment 1, which is consistent with 
our  hypothesis that  attention-based imagery was  used 
there but not here. 
We also found greater activation in imagery than  in 
the baseline task in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in both 
hemispheres (including area 46),  which may be involved 
in  looking up stored visual information to construct an 
image. However, we did not find more activation in the 
anterior cingulate gyrus  in  imagery  compared to  the 
baseline task. 
We also found another set of  activated areas that may 
be involved in  the process of  arranging segments of  an 
image  into a  composite. Specifically, we  found more 
activation in the frontal eye fields, the left inferior parietal 
area, the left  and right  superior parietal lobe, and the 
left and right angular gyri (but the left was only margin- 
ally significant,p C 0.06).  The left precentral gyrus (with 
coordinates -49.09,  -2.94, 36.00) was  also marginally 
significant by the post hoc test (p C 0.08). We also found 
activation in  the precuneus, left fusiform, and right hip- 
pocampal areas, none of  which was  predicted by  our 
theory. Finally, if  one had hypothesized such activation, 
two other regions would have been considered to show 
greater activation in  the  imagery task; we report these 
findings in case other investigators have made such pre- 
dictions: The  areas  were  Broca's  area  (-42.71,  4.71, 
24.00) and the insula (-31.24, 13.64, 8.00). 
Perception-Baseline Amiysk  We  also compared the 
pattern of  blood flow in the perception task with that in 
the baseline task. The  results of  this analysis are pre- 
sented in  Figures 2  and 6 and Table 4. As  is evident, 
many of  the same areas that were active during imagery 
were also active during perception. We  found greater 
activation in the region identified as on the  border  of 
areas 17  and 18  in the Talairach atlas, which presumably 
reflects the process of  encoding the patterns. This area 
was about 1 cm anterior to the part of  visual cortex that 
was  activated by  imagery; moreover it was  in the right 
hemisphere, whereas the area that was activated by  im- 
274  Journal of Cognitive Neumcience  Volume 5, Number 3 Table 4.  Coordinates (in mm, Relative to  the Anterior Commissure) andp Values for Regions in Which There Was More 
Activation during Perception Than in the Baseline Task in Experiment 2“ 
~~ 
Z  P  X  Y 
Midline regions 
Frontal  eye fields  3.19  14.91  48.00  0.07 
L@  hemiqkre mgim 
Area  19 
Inferior parietal 
Area  17/18 
Fusiform 
Thalamus 
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
-24.86 
-35.06 






















Right hem-  regions 
Superior parietal  23.59  -78.16  44.00  0.01 
Area  19  35.06  -61.59  -8.00  O.OOO6 
Inferior parietal  47.81  -51.39  56.00  0.002 
Fusiform  42.71  -48.84  -16.00  0.01 
Postcentral gyrus  56.74  -  11.86  52.00  0.05 
Caudate  18.49  -9.69  28.00  0.06 
Precentral gyms  49.09  8.54  48.00  0.01 
Dorsolateral prefrontal  46.54  14.91  40.00  0.02 
“Regions are presented from posterior to  anterior. Midline regions lie in  the  saggital aspect of  the brain; some lateralized regions are on the 
lateral surface, and some are medial,  as illustrated in Figure 6.  Seen from the rear of  the head, the X  coordinate is  horizontal (with positive values 
to  the right), the Y  coordinate is in depth (with positive values anterior to  the anterior commissure), and the 2  coordinate is vertical (with positive 
values superior to  the anterior commissure). 
agery was in the left hemisphere. We also found bilateral 
activation of  visual association area 19, but did not find 
activation of  the middle temporal or inferior temporal 
gyri. This is of  interest because the subjects did not need 
to  identify the pattern  in  order to  perform  this  task; 
rather, they needed only to segregate figure from ground, 
encode the X, and detect whether the X was on or off 
the figure. In addition, although the thalamus was active 
(with the centroid now being slightly to the left of  mid- 
line), the centroid of  activation was  not in the pulvinar 
per se. 
We also found greater activation in perception than in 
the baseline task in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in both 
hemispheres (including area 46), which may be involved 
in looking up stored visual information to construct an 
image. And we again found another set of  activated areas 
that may be involved in the process of  shifting attention 
to  arrange the segments of  the figure. Specifically, we 
found the left  and right inferior parietal regions, right 
superior parietal lobe, and there was  a trend  towards 
more activation in the frontal eye fields (p < 0.07). 
We also found activation in the left and right fusiform 
gyri as well as the right caudate nucleus, right precentral 
gyrus and right postcentral gyrus. We  had no grounds 
for predicting activation in any of  these areas. Finally, if 
one had hypothesized such activation, several other re- 
gions would have been considered to show greater ac- 
tivation  in  the  perception  task:  the  left-hemisphere 
supplementary motor cortex (-32.51,  -14.41,20.00) and 
insula (-32.51,  9.54, 12.00) and the  right hemisphere 
angular  gyms  (36.34,  -79.44,  28.00),  hippocampus 
(15.94, -38.64,  8.00), and inferior frontal lobe (35.06, 
26.39, -  12.00). 
Discussion 
In part because we included an additional within-subjects 
condition, this experiment produced a wealth of  findings; 
we will  focus here on three  sets of  results that  have 
particular theoretical significance. Perhaps of  most inter- 
est, we found more activation in a region identified as 
area 17 by the Talairach atlas during imagery than during 
the baseline task,  even when exactly the same stimuli 
were present in both tasks. Indeed, the coordinates of 
this area are very similar to those found in Experiment 
1: in that experiment, the centroid was approximately 65 
mm posterior to  the AC,  whereas in this experiment it 
was  approximately 63 mm posterior to  the AC.  Again, 
this centroid is probably too far anterior to reflect acti- 
vation in area 17. Although the Talairach and Tournoux 
(1988) atlas shows area 17 extending as far  as 60 mm 
posterior to the AC, the area of  activation is close to the 
border of  areas 17, 18, and 30. The  similarity of  this 
result from the two  experiments is noteworthy because 
different subjects participated and the procedures dif- 
fered in many respects. Because the stimuli were pre- 
sented for only 200 msec in Experiment 2, these imagery 
results cannot be  ascribed to  the way subjects scanned 
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Experiment 1 in the activation of  this part of  visual cortex 
is  that the centroid was to the right of  center in Experi- 
ment  2. We  also found that imagery activated area 18, 
which is almost certainly a topographically mapped re- 
gion of  cortex in humans. The centroid here was slightly 
to the left of  the midline. 
Second, we now found activation in areas that may be 
involved  in  the  storage  or recall of  visual  memories. 
When we compared activation in the imagery task to that 
in the baseline task, we found more activation in the left 
and right middle temporal gyri, the left inferior temporal 
gyrus, and the right area  19. Similarly, when we com- 
pared  blood  flow  in  the imagery  task  to  that  in  the 
perception  task, we found more activation  in  the left 
middle temporal gyrus, left inferior temporal gyrus, and 
left  area  19. These findings are consistent with Douglas 
and Rockland’s (1992) report that there are direct con- 
nections from area TE (the anterior part of  IT) to retin- 
otopically mapped areas (area 17, in particular). These 
areas were not more active in imagery than in perception 
in Experiment 1, and are consistent with the claim that 
the present version of  the task induced visual-memory- 
based imagery. In addition, we now found more activa- 
tion in the imagery task than in the perception or base- 
line tasks in  the  superior parietal  regions, which  may 
reflect the role of  this area in the disengage process (see 
Corbetta et al., in press). We also found activation in the 
left inferior  parietal  lobe  during  imagery, which  may 
reflect its role in encoding the spatial relations among 
segments during the construction process (see Kosslyn, 
1987). Recall that we did not find parietal activation in 
Experiment 1, which we suggested might reflect contin- 
ued engagement of  attention. Also  consistent with the 
putative difference in the two  types of  imagery, we did 
not find selective activation in the pulvinar in the present 
experiment. 
Third, we now did not find more activation in visual 
cortex during the imagery task than during the percep- 
tion task.  In  addition, in  the perception  task-like  the 
imagery task-we  found that the subjects made more 
errors when evaluating probes on segments that would 
be imaged late in the sequence of  segments. This result 
is  not  found  in  the perceptual  task  when  stimuli  are 
intact, but  is  found in the  imagery version of  the  task 
(e.g., see Kosslyn  et  al., 1988). These findings suggest 
that we did induce the subjects to use imagery at least 
some of  the time in the perception task. Indeed, some 
of  the same areas were active in both the perception and 
imagery tasks  relative to  the baseline task, specifically 
those that we hypothesize are used to  look up stored 
information and shift attention to the location where a 
segment should be visualized. 
But the imagery and perception tasks did not produce 
identical patterns of  activation, relative to  the baseline 
task. Even the areas that were activated in common were 
typically more activated during imagery. This is not sur- 
prising, however, if  imagery was used only partially in 
the perception  task. But  a  number of  areas that were 
active in imagery (compared to  the baseline) were not 
active in perception  (compared to the baseline): these 
areas were, specifically, area 18, the left middle temporal 
gyrus, left inferior temporal gyrus, right middle temporal 
gyrus, right  superior  parietal  lobe, right  hippocampus 
and the precuneus area. On the other hand, left area 19, 
right  fusiform  cortex, the  right  caudate nucleus,  right 
precentral  gyrus,  and right  postcentral gyrus  all were 
activated in perception (compared to the baseline) but 
not activated in imagery (compared to the baseline). 
One of  the most interesting aspects of  these findings 
is that the middle temporal lobe and inferior temporal 
lobe were not selectively activated during our perception 
task. These findings may suggest either that subjects used 
visual-memory-based imagery  during  the imagery task 
but  completed  the  patterns  using  attentional  imagery 
during the perception  task, or that visual memories are 
activated by  the joint operation of  several areas-not  all 
of  which were necessary when the object was partially 
visible. The fact that  left  area  19  was activated during 
perception but not imagery (relative to the baseline task) 
may suggest that this region of  the brain stores a type of 
visual information that is specifically useful for complet- 
ing a pattern but which is  not used as much when the 
pattern is generated from scratch. It is possible that this 
information is also used to guide motor processing, but 
we will not speculate about that here. These alternatives 
can be distinguished empirically in future research. 
Finally, although we again found greater activation of 
the  anterior  cingulate gyrus  in  imagery  compared  to 
perception, we did not find that this structure was more 
active in  imagery than  in the baseline  condition. This 
result may indicate that the anterior cingulate is involved 
in a kind of  “anticipatory priming.” In the baseline task, 
the subjects needed to respond as soon as the stimulus 
appeared, and they may have prepared  to  encode the 
stimulus as soon as the cue appeared. It is possible that 
the process that primes one to “expect to see something” 
is the  same as that used to generate mental images (for 
an  extended  discussion  of  this  idea,  see Kosslyn,  in 
press).  Presumably, less such anticipatory priming was 
used in perception because one had to encode the stim- 
ulus  more fully prior to  determining  the correct  re- 
sponse. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
The  results  of  the  previous  experiments  suggest  that 
imagery activates topographically organized portions of 
visual cortex, but they do not definitively demonstrate 
that this is the case. In this experiment we adapted the 
logic of  Fox  et  al. (1986) to  an imagery  experiment. 
Rather than varying the visual angle subtended by a per- 
ceived object, we varied the “visual angle” subtended by 
imagined patterns. If  the posterior, medial region of  cor- 
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2  is topographically organized, then we expect different 
portions of it to be more strongly activated when objects 
are visualized at different sizes. 
In this experiment the subjects closed their eyes and 
listened to  names of letters of  the alphabet along with 
cue words.  Each  cue specified one of  four judgments 
(e.g., whether the uppercase letter has only straight lines 
or any curved lines). The subjects visualized the letters 
at the smallest possible “visible” size during one block 
of trials and at the largest possible “nonoverflowing”  size 
during another block of  trials. In both cases, the letters 
were to be centered in front of  them and maintained at 
the appropriate size until the cue word was presented. 
We again were concerned about the appropriate base- 
line condition. Petersen (personal communication,  1992) 
found that listening to the names of  letters when one’s 
eyes  were closed reduced  blood  flow in  the occipital 
lobe. If so, then subtracting blood flow in this task from 
that in  an imagery task could mislead us into inferring 
increases in blood flow in the imagery task. We  decided 
that for the question we wanted to answer here, an ideal 
control task was the task itself: If the subjects form images 
of  tiny  letters directly in  front of  them, much  spatial 
variation would  occur  in  a  small, foveal  region of  a 
topographically mapped area. In contrast, if  the subjects 
formed images of  large letters, this foveal region would 
contain little spatial variation (only part of  one segment 
of  a larger letter, at  most). Hence we expected greater 
metabolic activity within the foveal region for small let- 
ters  than  large ones. In  contrast, large letters should 
extend into more peripheral regions. Hence we expected 
greater metabolic activity farther from the foveal repre- 
sentation when large images were formed. 
This reasoning led us to subtract the blood flow in the 
large image condition from blood flow in the small im- 
age  condition, which  would  reveal  regions that  were 
more activated by small images. Similarly, we subtracted 
the blood flow in the small image condition from that 
in the large image condition, which revealed regions that 
were more activated by large images. These subtractions 
would not only reveal variations in activity along topo- 
graphically mapped areas, but also would indicate which 
other areas were more activated during the two  condi- 
tions. Kosslyn  (1975) found that subjects require more 
time to evaluate objects imaged at small sizes (presum- 
ably because of some kind of  “grain effect,”  perhaps due 
to spatial summation). Thus, if subjects follow the instruc- 
tions, they should require more time to evaluate prop- 
erties of  letters imaged at a smaller size than at a larger 
(but not overflowing) size. 
Results 
Behauioral Results 
We  began  by  analyzing the  response times and error 
rates. Although the overall means were consistent with 
Kosslyn’s (1975) previous findings, with the subjects re- 
quiring more time for smaller images (2040 and 2157 
msec for large and small images, respectively), when all 
16 subjects were considered this difference was not sig- 
nificant, F(1, 15)  = 1.48, p  > 0.2. Similarly, although 
there were slightly more errors for small images, this 
too  was  not  a  significant  difference (13.0 and  15.1% 
errors, for large and small images, respectively), F  < 1. 
We  did not feel justified in assuming that differences in 
blood flow reflect the effects of  image size unless we 
had the corresponding behavioral index that the subjects 
did in fact use images at the different sizes. On examining 
the data, it was clear that although the majority of  subjects 
produced the expected difference in times, several did 
not. We thus ordered the subjects in terms of  the differ- 
ence in response time for large-small trials, from largest 
positive difference to  largest negative difference. When 
the three subjects who had a response time difference 
of  at  least 100 msec in the unexpected direction were 
eliminated, we now found that the remaining 13 subjects 
required more time to evaluate the letters imaged at the 
smaller sizes (with means of  1878 and  2100 msec for 
large and small images), F(1, 12) = 5.35,p <  0.04. (This 
test must be regarded only as a heuristic, however, given 
that  the subjects were  no longer  randomly sampled.) 
The error rates for these subjects were 14.2%  for large 
images and 15.7%  for small images, F<1,  which shows 
that there was no speed-accuracy tradeoff. Thus, we felt 
justified in examining the patterns of  blood flow for these 
subjects only. 
PET Results 
The results are illustrated in  Figures 2 and 7, and are 
summarized in Table 5. First, when we examined selec- 
tive activation when large images were formed (i.e., the 
pattern of  blood flow from small images was subtracted 
from the pattern of  blood flow from large images), we 
found greater activity in a region of  area 17 (as identified 
by  the Talairach atlas) that was  about 69 mm  posterior 
to the AC. In contrast, when we examined selective ac- 
tivation when small images were formed (i.e.,  the pattern 
of  blood flow from large images was subtracted from the 
pattern of  blood  flow  from small  images), we  found 
greater activity in a region of  area 17  (as identified by 
the Talairach atlas) that was about 88 mm  posterior to 
the AC.  Both  areas of  activation were  to  the  right  of 
midline, which is consistent with Sergent’s  (1989) finding 
that subjects perform this sort of  task faster when the 
cues are presented to the left visual field. 
When we examined the regions that were specifically 
activated by large images, we found two other areas were 
over the SPM threshold, both in the left hemisphere: the 
superior temporal gyrus and the middle temporal gyrus. 
If images formed at a large size are more detailed, as the 
evidence suggests (see Kosslyn, 1980), then these results 
may speak to the additional processing that’was involved 
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Experiment 3. The left and 
right cerebral hemispheres, 
seen from lateral and medial 
views. The triangles represent 
the loci of  significant increases 
in activity when images were 
formed at a large size instead 
of  a small size, and the circles 
represent the loci of  significant 
increases in activity when im- 
ages were formed at a small 
size instead of  a large size. The 
tick marks on the axes specify 
20 mm  increments relative to 
the anterior commissure. 
LATERAL VIEW  m1 
RIGHT /-h 
A LARGE minus SMALL 
@  SMALL  I1 
UEDIAL VIEW 
Table 5.  Results of  Experiment 3" 
X  Y  Z  P 
La?-gt+mN 
Leji hernipbere regions 
Middle temporal 
Superior temporal 
Right  hemipbere regions 
Area  17  (anterior ROI) 
Small-Large 
Leji hemipbere regions 
Precentral gyrus 
Right hemipbere regions 
Area  17  (posterior ROI) 
Dorsolateral prefrontal 
-58.01  -23.34 





8.29  -69.24  8.00  0.05 









aActivation specific to large mental images was examined by subtracting activation from small mental images and activation specific to small mental 
images was examined by subtracting activation from large mental images. Coordinates (in mm, relative to the anterior commissure) and p values. 
Regions are presented from posterior to anterior. Midline regions lie in the saggital aspect of  the brain; some lateralized regions are on the lateral 
surface, and some are medial, as illustrated in Figure 7. Seen from the rear of  the head, the X  coordinate is  horizontal  (with positive values to 
the right), the Y coordinate is  in depth (with positive values anterior to the anterior commissure), and the Z  coordinate is vertical (with positive 
values superior to the anterior commissure). 
in  forming more sharply defined letters. Note  that it is 
unlikely that more parts (segments) were added to larger 
images; not only do letters have relatively few parts, but 
we found no additional activation in the other areas that 
we inferred to be involved in generating multipart im- 
ages. In  addition,  if  one had  specifically made  these 
predictions,  other areas would  have  been significantly 
more active with  the large images; as in the previous 
experiments, we list these results for  the use of  other 
investigators,  who may have different theories than ours. 
These areas (followed by X,  Y,  Z coordinates) were area 
18 (1.91, -79.44,  24.00) along  the  midline;  left-hemi- 
sphere posterior  cingulate  (-7.01,  -53.94,  16.00), the 
caudate (-10.84,  2.16, 8.00), and dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (-28.69,50.61,  -4.00); and right hemisphere area 
19  (7.01,  -83.26,  24.00),  postcentral  gyrus  (31.24, 
-34.81,  64.00), amygdala (19.76, -4.21,  -  16.00), and 
inferior frontal cortex (35.06, 14.91, -  12.00). 
In addition, two other areas were specifically activated 
by  small  images, relative to  large  ones: the left-hemi- 
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solateral prefrontal area. We  have no theory about why 
these areas were selectively active here. Finally, the fol- 
lowing  areas would  have  been significant if  one had 
specifically predicted them to be: left-hemisphere supe- 
rior parietal (-19.76,  -69.24,  40.00), area 19  (-10.84, 
-66.69,36.00), parahippocampal gyrus (-31.24,  -45.01, 
0.00), thalamus (-5.74, -  18.24,8.00),  and inferior frontal 
cortex (-43.99,  30.21, 4.00); and right-hemisphere hip- 
pocampus (26.14, -36.09,  -4.00),  supramarginal gyrus 
(55.46, -33.54,  24.00), precentral gyrus (35.06, -22.06, 
52.00),  postcentral gyrus (42.71, -20.79,48.00), putamen 
(17.21, 0.89, 4.00), and caudate (9.56, 20.01, 0.00). 
Finally, when we examined the data from all 16 sub- 
jects, we found substantially the same results  as those 
reported above. Critically, we again found more activa- 
tion for the smaller images in the posterior part of  area 
17  and  more activation for  the  larger  images  in  the 
anterior part of  area 17. However, the effect was not as 
large as that reported above (particularly in the anterior 
region), which is  as we would expect if  the additional 
three subjects we included did not  in fact perform  the 
task. 
Discussion 
We now have strong evidence that visual mental images 
rely on topographically organized regions of  visual cor- 
tex; these results are particularly noteworthy because the 
subjects’ eyes were closed throughout the duration of 
the task. Specifically, we found that letters visualized at a 
relatively small visual  angle activated a  very posterior 
portion of  visual cortex more than letters visualized at a 
relatively large visual angle. We  expected greater meta- 
bolic activity within a small region for the small images 
because more complex spatial variations had to be rep- 
resented in that region. In contrast, we found that letters 
visualized at a relatively large visual angle activated an 
anterior region of  visual  cortex more than  did letters 
visualized at a small visual angle. This result follows if 
the large image extended into portions of  the visual area 
that represent more peripheral parts of  the field. 
The activation we found in this experiment appears to 
be about where one would expect if area 17 were in fact 
activated. Fox et al. (1986) examined activation caused 
by  alternating  checkerboard  stimuli  that  subtended 
means of  0.07, 3.5, and 10.5” of  visual angle; these cen- 
troids were (translated into Talairach & Tournoux, 1988 
coordinates courtesy of  S. Petersen)  -83.7,  -77.7,  and 
-74.18 mm posterior to the AC,  respectively. In the pres- 
ent experiment, letters visualized at the smallest legible 
size activated a region 88 mm posterior to  the AC;  this 
suggests that subjects could form an image at a fraction 
of  a degree of  visual angle, which is consistent with the 
size at which one can read a letter when a page is held 
at arm’s length. In addition, when subjects were asked 
to form images of  the letters as large as possible while 
still remaining “visible,”  we found selective activation 69 
mm posterior to  the AC.  Kosslyn (1978) describes psy- 
chophysical tasks that allow one to  measure the visual 
angle subtended by imaged objects when they just begin 
to “overflow” the image. Although the angle varied de- 
pending on the precise procedure, for line drawings of 
animals they were as small as about 12.5”, and for fea- 
tureless solid rectangular shapes, 16.5”;  however, the an- 
gle  was  approximately  20.5”  for  featureless  solid 
rectangular shapes with slightly different instructions and 
procedure. If we assume that the visual field is arranged 
along calcarine  cortex  according  (approximately) to  a 
logarithmic scale (e.g., see Schwartz, 1980; Van  Essen, 
Newsome, & Maunsell, 1984), then 69 mm is roughly 
within the region that Fox et al.’s finding would lead us 
to expect the large images to activate. 
However, we must note that the activation at the pos- 
terior part of  area 17  may have arisen from foveal acti- 
vation of  other areas that meet area 17 at this point. In 
the monkey, at least four areas (Vl, V2, V3, and V4)  all 
meet at the occipital pole and all represent the fovea at 
that location (see Van  Essen, 1985). It is  clear that the 
responses of  neurons in at least one of  these areas, V4, 
can be modulated by nonvisual input (e.g.,  see Haenny, 
Maunsell, & Schiller, 1988; Moran & Desimone,  1985). 
Thus, foveal activation engendered by tiny images could 
reflect activity in the human homologues to any one (or 
combination) of  these areas. The small images selectively 
activated the portion of  visual cortex that represents the 
fovea, presumably because more visual complexity was 
packed  into that region  than occurred  with  the larger 
images. In contrast, when we subtracted the  activation 
engendered by  small images from that engendered by 
large images, we found a focus of  activation at the ante- 
rior part of  area  17; the activated region  appears to be 
about where it should be if area 17 was in fact activated. 
But, given the precision of  measurement, we cannot rule 
out the possibility that another topographically organized 
area that is near area 17 was in fact activated. We must 
be cautious about making strong claims about localiza- 
tion, given the fact that the images were averaged over 
subjects and that there are great individual differences 
in the size and position of  area 17 (e.g., see Redemacher, 
Caviness, Steinmetz, & Galaburda, 1993). 
Finally, we found that right-hemisphere visual cortex 
was selectively activated during imagery. We  suggested 
earlier that right-hemisphere activation of  visual cortex 
may reflect visual-memory-based imagery. It is  possible 
that subjects used this sort of  imagery because the alter- 
native, attention-based imagery, is  more difficult to  use 
when one’s eyes are closed. Attention-based imagery de- 
pends on allocating attention to specific regions of  space, 
which may be easier when a visual structure is provided 
by the environment rather than having to be supplied in 
imagery. If  the visual framework is also imaged, subjects 
may have difficulty maintaining it long enough to allocate 
attention over it. 
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Our results suggest that visual mental imagery activates 
at least two, and possibly three, areas of  visual cortex 
that  are known to  be-or almost  certainly are-topo- 
graphically organized in the  human brain. One area is 
identified as area 17 in the  Talairach atlas; this area is 
most likely to have actually been activated in Experiment 
3. In  addition, at  least some types of  imagery activate 
area  18 (see Experiment 2).  Finally, there  is  an extra- 
striate area that lies just anterior to area 17 that is also 
activated during imagery (Experiments 1  and 2); this area 
is probably topographically organized. The  finding that 
even  one topographically  organized  part  of  cortex  is 
activated during visual mental imagery suggests that im- 
age representations are spatially organized; amodal lin- 
guistic  representations  would  not  be  supported  by 
topographically mapped cortex. 
The imagery used in Experiments 1 and 2 apparently 
did not activate the same part of  visual cortex that was 
activated during Experiment 3. One possible explanation 
for this disparity is that the perceptual input when one’s 
eyes are open is so strong that it overwhelms any acti- 
vation  from  imagery in  area 17 proper, and hence we 
did not detect such activity in the first two  experiments. 
Another possibility is  that there may be  another visual 
area anterior to area 17 that is  only activated when one 
melds images with perceived stimuli. Alternatively, this 
more anterior area may be activated during imagery only 
when one must override perceptual input from the eyes. 
We must consider a potential problem with the present 
findings. One could argue that the greater activation of 
visual cortex in imagery versus perception we found in 
Experiment 1, and the greater activation of  visual cortex 
in imagery versus the baseline we found in Experiment 
2, occurred because this area is activated whenever sub- 
jects must perform a difficult visual task. We  could re- 
spond in  two  ways. First, even  if  this possibility were 
correct, the results are important because there was no 
actual vkualpattern in the grid during the imagery task: 
the “visual”  difficulty arises in part due to the contribu- 
tion of  imagery. Thus, even if  visual cortex is  activated 
during visual mental imagery simply because the  task is 
visually difficult (perhaps because visual imagery inter- 
feres with  visual  encoding),  the fact  that  images  can 
substitute for percepts in defining “visual difficulty” is of 
interest. Second, it  is not clear what  “difficulty” corre- 
sponds to  in a processing sense. “Difficulty”  can be de- 
fined only relative to the specific processing capabilities 
of  a system; what is difficult for human beings might not 
be for a different species. If  “difficulty” means that the 
pattern  cannot  be  easily encoded  bottom-up, then in 
difficult perceptual  tasks  imagery may  be used  during 
encoding-as  apparently occurred in Experiment 2. Im- 
agery can arise not only because information is activated 
in long-term memory to  form a spatial image, but also 
because input can be retained for a prolonged  period 
(in which case imagery serves as a kind of  on-line short- 
term  memory).  If  this view  is  correct, then  “difficult” 
visual tasks result  in greater activation in visual cortex 
because imagery is  used; if  so, then such tasks should 
also cause greater activation of  the middle temporal gy- 
rus or the pulvinar (if visual-memory based or attention- 
based  imagery is used, respectively). In any event, it is 
clear that imagery is not confined to retention of  on-line 
input. The subjects in Experiment 3 had their eyes closed 
during the entire task; there was  no actual visual input 
at all. 
Our findings have several broader implications.  It is 
well known that the majority of  visual areas in the ma- 
caque monkey have reciprocal connections to other vis- 
ual areas, receiving information from the areas to which 
they send information (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991;  Van 
Essen, 1985). The fact that stored information can evoke 
visual patterns in relatively “low level” visual areas during 
imagery suggests that the reciprocal connections princi- 
ple applies to the human brain as well (for convergent 
data and some similar ideas, see Damasio, Damasio, Tra- 
nel, & Brandt, 1990;  Hebb, 1968). In addition, the finding 
that imagery afTects relatively low-level visual areas raises 
the possibility that  “top-down’’ processing  may  play  a 
greater role in perception than is currently assumed. The 
results  from  Experiment  2  suggest  that  visual  mental 
imagery may be used in perception itself when one is 
faced with fragmentary input. 
In addition, we were intrigued by our finding that the 
imagery used in Experiment 1 selectively activated left- 
hemisphere visual cortex whereas the imagery used  in 
Experiments  2  and  3 selectively activated  right-hemi- 
sphere visual cortex. Kosslyn  (1988) and Kosslyn et al. 
(1993) found that subjects could perform the grids im- 
age-generation task faster if  the stimuli were lateralized 
to the right visual field, so that the left  hemisphere re- 
ceived the information initially. This finding is consistent 
with Farah’s (1984) original analysis of  image generation 
deficits following brain damage, and with Kosslyn, Holtz- 
man, Gazzaniga, and Farah’s (1985) finding that the left 
hemispheres of  two split-brain patients were better than 
their  right hemispheres at  forming images of  multipart 
objects  (including  letters).  However,  Kosslyn  (1987, 
1988), Kosslyn et al. (1993), and Sergent (1989, 1990) all 
report that under  some circumstances the right  hemi- 
sphere can  generate  images  better  than  the left.  For 
example,  Sergent  (1989)  found  that  normal  subjects 
could evaluate the relative heights of  lower case letters 
better if the cue was shown in the ,left visual field. It is 
possible that this disparity reflects differences in the type 
of  imagery used. When attention-based imagery is used, 
the left hemisphere may be superior; but when visual- 
memory  based  imagery is  used,  the right  hemisphere 
may have an edge. Our results suggest that PET  will be 
a valuable tool in understanding the apparent contradic- 
tions that now lace the literature on this topic. 
We  also found that other areas used in visual percep- 
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areas were as predicted if image generation involves an 
iterative process of  activating and positioning individual 
parts of  imaged objects. The present  results implicate 
structures that  may  correspond  to specific component 
processes used in visual imagery, and are consistent with 
the idea that there are at least two distinct ways to form 
visual  mental  images. But  these findings just  skim the 
surface. There may be many types of  mental images, and 
many ways of  using them (see Kosslyn, in press; Kosslyn 
& Shin, 1993).  This project has led us to formulate several 
hypotheses,  which now must be explicitly addressed. PET 
research is  ideally suited to help discover the nature of 
component processes used in imagery and the circum- 
stances in which they are used. 
EXPERIMENT  1 METHOD 
Subjects 
Two  groups of  seven right-handed men volunteered to 
participate as paid subjects. The subjects in the imagery 
group had a mean age of  24.0 years, with a range of 18.2 
to 33.3; the subjects in the sensory-motor control group 
had  a mean age of  25.7 years, with a range of  19.3 to 
36.4. None of  the subjects was taking medication, and all 
reported being in good health. All subjects were unaware 
of the purposes and predictions of the experiment at the 
time of testing. No  subject was tested in more than one 
experiment reported in this article. 
Materials 
Sixteen uppercase (A,B,C,E,F,G,HJ,L,O,P,R,S,T,U,Y)  and 16 
lowercase (a,b,d,e,f,g,h,i,j,l,n,p,q,t,v,y)  letters were used 
as stimuli. For  the  perception  trials, the  letters were 
drawn in  light gray in 4x5 grids; these grids subtended 
2.6 (horizontal) by  3.4 (vertical) degrees of  visual angle 
from the subject’s viewpoint. For the imagery trials, the 
light gray block letter was eliminated, and centered be- 
neath each grid was the opposite case letter in a script 
font. The X mark probe remained in the same place for 
the corresponding imagery and perception trials. The 
sensory-motor control trials were identical except that 
the lowercase cue was removed. 
A  separate group of  20  subjects drew the  letters in 
grids while the order in which they added segments was 
surreptitiously recorded. Half of  the “yes”  and half of  the 
“no”  trials fell on or adjacent to a segment that typically 
was drawn during the initial phases of  printing the letter, 
and were called “early” trials; the other half were on or 
adjacent to a segment that typically was  drawn during 
the final phases of  printing the letter, and were called 
“late”  trials. 
The experiment was conducted with a Macintosh Plus 
computer with a Polaroid CP-50 screen filter (to reduce 
glare), using  the  MacLab  1.6 program  (Costin, 1988), 
which presented the stimuli and recorded subjects’ re- 
sponses. The computer rested on a gantry approximately 
45 cm from the subject’s  eyes; the screen was tilted down 
to face the subject. 
Task Procedure 
The subjects in the imagery group first studied the 16 
uppercase and  16 lowercase letters. When  they  were 
familiar with the letters’ appearance, the imagery trials 
began. A grid appeared with an X mark and a lowercase 
cue beneath. The  subject decided whether  the  corre- 
sponding uppercase block letter would have covered the 
X mark if  it were present in the grid. If the letter would 
have covered the X, the subject pressed a pedal with his 
right foot; if the letter would not have covered the X, he 
pressed another pedal with his left foot (we used a foot 
response  because  the  activation  due  to  responding 
would be high in the motor strip, out of  the way of  areas 
of  interest). As soon as the subject responded, the stim- 
ulus was  removed. After  a delay of  500 msec the next 
trial began. The subjects began by performing 32 practice 
trials with  digits instead of  letters to  familiarize them 
with the procedure and ensure that they understood the 
task. Any  errors were discussed with the experimenter, 
and  the  instructions. were  reviewed  if  necessary. The 
actual test trials began 2 min before scanning and con- 
tinued for  18-22  mins. The  stimuli were ordered ran- 
domly, except that the same type of  trial (earlyilate) or 
response (yesho) could not occur more than three times 
in succession and the same letter could not occur twice 
within a sequence of  three trials. Subjects first completed 
128 trials with uppercase letters, and then received low- 
ercase letter trials until the end of  the session. 
In  the  sensory-motor trials, the  computer was  pro- 
grammed to have a mean delay of  3172 msec before the 
X mark was  removed, with durations varying according 
to a Gaussian distribution with sigma = 2376 msec. When 
the time to respond was  added on, the subjects in the 
imagery group viewed the grids for a mean of  3478 msec 
per trial, compared to 3480 msec per trial in the sensory- 
motor control group, a  nonsignificant difference, t  C 
1. Thus, subjects in the imagery and sensory-motor con- 
trol groups viewed the grids for the same amounts of 
time. 
The perception baseline task was performed second, 
after the imagery or sensory-motor task (depending on 
the group), because we did not want subjects to  over- 
learn  the  appearance of  the  letters  in  the  grids; we 
wanted the imagery task to be as challenging as possible 
in order to evoke the largest changes in blood flow. 
PET Procedure 
Following informed consent, a small catheter was placed 
in the radial artery of  the right arm for blood sampling. 
A  custom-molded plastic  foam  head  holder  was  con- 
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that tomographic slices could be obtained parallel to the 
canthomeatal (CM)  line. Subjects also received a CT scan 
(GE 8800) using the same head holder, which maintained 
a reference geometry and permitted registration with the 
PET  data. PET  scanning was  performed with a Scanditro- 
nix  PC-384  tomograph  (Litton,  Bergstrom,  Eriksson, 
Bohm, & Blomquist, 1984) during continuous inhalation 
of  150, which efficiently labels HzO.  Subjects breathed 
%-CO2  for 20 min, during which time one of  the tasks 
was performed. PET  scanning began 8 min after the start 
of  inhalation and was carried out in three separate mea- 
sures of  4 min each. During each task, the scanning bed 
was indexed 9.5 mm between each measurement, yield- 
ing  nine contiguous PET  slices. Arterial blood samples 
(approximately 0.8 ml) were drawn every 60 sec from 
the drip of  a continuous withdrawal pump (2  mumin) 
beginning 7 min after the start of  inhalation. 
PET Data Analysis 
PET  data were corrected for the effects of  random co- 
incidences, dead time, scattered radiation, detector non- 
uniformity, and photon attenuation, and were calibrated 
by  comparison with measurements using a well scintil- 
lation counter. Tissue concentration images were recon- 
structed  using  a  conventional  filtered  pack-projection 
algorithm to an in-plane spatial resolution of  8 mm full 
width at half  maximum (FWHM).  The blood concentra- 
tion history and tissue concentration images were used 
to  compute CBF  maps with a modification of  the equi- 
librium method, as described by Senda, Buxton, Alpert, 
Correia, Mackay, Weise, and Ackerman (1988). 
To  prepare the data for activation analysis, the CBF 
data for each subject were normalized over the three 
scan positions  in  each task, to  account for  run-to-run 
variations in global mean CBF. The global mean flow for 
a task was determined as an area-weighted average over 
whole  brain  ROIs  drawn  on each of  the  nine  slices. 
Percent relative difference images were computed, pixel- 
by-pixel, from CBF images, paired by  task, and normal- 
ized by  the grand mean flow over both tasks. A stereo- 
tactic coordinate transformation was determined so that 
each subject's scan could be represented in the reference 
system of  Talairach et al. (1967).  The method used to 
perform the stereotactic transformation was an extension 
of  the  St. Louis  method  (Fox, Perlmutter, &  Raichle, 
1985), with the X-ray plane film  replaced by  a CT  scout 
view obtained in registration with the PET  scan. An op- 
erator identified the locations of  critical landmarks by 
positioning the cursor on the screen, and used the co- 
ordinates of the glabella, inion, limbus sphenoidale (LS), 
and sulcus transversus (ST) to estimate the AC-PC  line 
(Fox et al., 1985; Talairach et al., 1967; Tokunaga, Takase, 
& Otani, 1977; Takase, Tokunaga, Otani, & Horie, 1977). 
Then, the directions of  the stereotactic axes were com- 
puted. The coordinates of  the midsagittal plane and the 
maximum  dimensions of  the  brain  were  determined 
from the PET  scan data. 
The CBF images and relative differences images then 
were rescaled, interpolated, and transformed to a stan- 
dard  stereotactic  coordinate  system  (Talairach  et  al., 
1967). Slices were computed in the system every 4 mm 
beginning 8 mm below the AC-PC  line. The slices were 
horizontally oriented in the stereotactic coordinate sys- 
tem (i-e.,  were parallel to the AC-FC  line and perpendic- 
ular  to  the  midsagittal plane). For  visual analysis, the 
transformed  CBF  and  relative difference images were 
summed, slice by slice, over the seven subjects in  each 
group to provide mean CBF and mean relative difference 
images for each slice in each group. 
EXPERIMENT  2 METHOD 
Sub]ects 
Thirteen men volunteered to participate as paid subjects 
(mean age 20 years 8 months, with a range of  18 years 
7 months to  23 years  2 months). All  but two  were at- 
tending college in the Boston area at the time of  testing. 
Twelve subjects were  right-handed and  one was  left- 
handed. All  subjects reported having good vision and 
none reported that they were taking medication. None 
of the subjects was aware of  the experimental hypotheses 
at the time of  testing. 
Materials 
The  16  uppercase letter stimuli used  in Experiment 1 
were used as stimuli here. For the perception trials, the 
letters were drawn in light gray, with a density of  ap- 
proximately 82.5 pixels per cm2. The grid background 
(the cells not filled in by the uppercase block letter) was 
filled in a lighter gray, with a density of  about 45% of 
that of  the block letters (or about 37 pixels per cm2). 
Thus, the contrast between the  letter and background 
was reduced from the original set of  stimuli. In addition, 
the X probe now consisted of  dashed lines one pixel 
wide; each dash was  1 pixel long, and dashes were sep- 
arated by a space equivalent to  2 pixels. Each script cue 
was removed from beneath the test stimulus, and instead 
was individually centered on another screen (which was 
now presented prior to the test stimulus). 
For  the  imagery and baseline trials, the gray  block 
letter was eliminated from the grid, as was the light gray 
background, leaving only the dashed X probe within the 
grid. Like  the perception stimuli, each script cue was 
removed from beneath the test stimulus, and instead was 
individually centered on another screen (which was now 
presented prior to the test stimulus). 
Task Procedure 
Improvements in our technique allowed us to administer 
more than two tasks per subject, and so 5 subjects (mean 
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23 years 2 months) performed the baseline, imagery, and 
perception  tasks. In  the baseline task, they viewed the 
same stimuli as in the imagery task, but prior to studying 
the appearance of  the block letters within the grids. The 
subjects were instructed simply to view the stimuli “with- 
out trying to make sense of  them or make any connec- 
tions  between  them;” they  were  told  to  respond  by 
pressing a pedal as quickly as they could when the grid 
appeared; they were to alternate which foot they used to 
make the response from trial to trial. These subjects were 
interviewed after the experiment and asked whether they 
made any connections between the script letters and the 
grids and whether they visualized anything within the 
grids during the baseline task; all subjects reported hav- 
ing followed the instructions not to think about or make 
associations between the stimuli, and none reported vis- 
ualizing a pattern within the grid. These subjects com- 
pleted an average of  61 trials for the baseline task (with 
a range of  47-71),  an average of  62 trials in the percep- 
tion task  (range 57-64),  and an average of  58 trials in 
the imagery task (range 46-65).  The subjects required a 
mean of  350 msec to respond to the appearance of  the 
grid in the baseline task. 
Due to  time constraints, an additional eight subjects 
performed only  the imagery and perception  tasks.  As 
before, the imagery trials were always administered be- 
fore the perception trials. Prior to the imagery trials, the 
subjects first studied four block numbers (1,3,4,7), each 
within a grid, as well as the corresponding script cues. 
As soon as subjects reported knowing which cells of  the 
grid were filled by each of  the block numbers and knew 
which script cues went with which numbers, a series of 
practice trials was administered. Subjects completed  16 
practice trials, seeing each of  the four numbers twice 
with a “yes” probe and twice with a “no” probe. Once 
the practice trials were complete, the  subjects studied 
the  16 block letters as well  as 16 corresponding script 
letters that would serve as cues. The imagery trials were 
administered as soon as the subjects reported being fa- 
miliar with these block letters and their corresponding 
cues. The trials began 30 sec before scanning and con- 
tinued for an additional 2 min. On each trial the follow- 
ing events occurred: a  centered asterisk  appeared for 
500 msec; the screen was blank for 100 msec; the script 
cue appeared for 300 msec, followed by another blank 
screen for 100 msec; a grid, empty except for the dashed 
X probe, appeared for 200 msec. At  this point, subjects 
decided whether the X would cover the block letter if it 
were actually present in the grid. An asterisk appeared 
in  the center of  the screen  100 msec after the subject 
responded,  and  a  new  trial  began.  The  stimuli  were 
ordered  randomly, except  that  the same type  of trial 
(early/late probe position) or response (yesho) could 
not occur more than 3 times in succession and the same 
letter could not occur twice within a sequence of  3 trials. 
Both the imagery and perception tasks of  the experiment 
contained  128 trials, of  which  subjects  completed on 
average 57 in the imagery task (with a range of  32-101) 
and 62 in the perception task (with a range of 44-89). 
The perception  trials were identical  to the imagery 
ones except that the perceptual  stimuli were used. All 
other details of  the method  and procedure were the 
same as those from the corresponding task of  Experi- 
ment  1. As in the original experiment, the perception 
task was  always performed  second in order to  ensure 
that the subjects would not overlearn the letters’ appear- 
ance and the task would remain challenging. 
PET  Procedure 
The PET  procedure was similar to that of  Experiment 1, 
but we used a new PET scanner and an improved method 
of data analysis. The PET machine was a GE Scanditronix 
PC4096 15 slice whole-body tomograph, which was used 
in its stationary mode (see Kops et al., 1990). The camera 
produced contiguous slices that were 6.5 mm apart (cen- 
ter-to-center; the axial field was equal to 97.5 mm); the 
axial resolution was 6.0 mm FWHM.  The images were 
reconstructed using a measured attenuation correction 
and a Hanning-weighted reconstruction filter, which was 
set so that there was an 8.0 mm in-plane spatial resolution 
(FWHM).  When images were reconstructed, we also cor- 
rected for effects of  random coincidences, scattered ra- 
diation, and counting losses that result from dead time 
in the camera electronics. The PET  machine was  in  a 
suite built  specifically for this purpose, and the same 
conditions  were  used  for  all  testing-the  lights were 
dimmed and there was no conversation or intrusive ex- 
ternal noise. 
Each  subject was fitted with  a thermoplastic custom 
molded face mask  (TRUE  SCAN, Annapolis, MD). The 
subject’s head was aligned in the scanner relative to the 
CM  line, using fixed horizontal and vertical lasers that 
were positioned  relative to  the  slice  positions  of  the 
scanner. Once the mask was mounted so that the head 
was stabilized, nasal cannulae were hooked to a radio- 
labeled  gas  inflow, and  an  overlying  face  mask  was 
hooked to a vacuum. 
Before scanning began, several transmission measure- 
ments were made with an orbiting rod source over the 
axial extent covering the cerebral hemispheres and cer- 
ebellum. Twenty measurements were made on each PET 
run; the first three measurements were each made over 
10 sec, and the following 17 measurements were each 
made over 5 sec. The PET  protocol was  as follows: (1) 
the camera acquisition program was started (which mea- 
sured residual background from previous study); (2) 15 
sec later stimulus presentation  began; (3) 15 sec later, 
the 150-C02 gas administration  began; and (4)  60 sec 
later  scanning  ended, and the gas administration  was 
stopped. 
The images of  relative blood flow were based on scans 
4-16,  which were summed after reconstruction. The ter- 
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events per sec. Work in our laboratory has demonstrated, 
using  radial  artery cannulation,  that  integrated  counts 
over periods up to 90 sec are a linear function over the 
flow range of  0 to 130 ml/min/100 g. Thus, we did not 
need an arterial line to ensure that data can be charac- 
terized in units of  flow relative to the whole brain. 
PET  Data Analysis 
We  first pooled  each  slice of  the scan  data across  all 
behavioral conditions, and then  identified  the coordi- 
nates  of  midline  structures  across  all  slices.  A  least 
squares procedure was  applied to these coordinates to 
estimate the parameters of  the midsagittal plane. We next 
resliced the images parasagitally at 5.1 mm intervals. The 
brain surface of  a 10.2-mm parasagittal slice was outlined 
by  hand at the 50% threshold level (nominal). If  neces- 
sary, data that were missing from  the surfaces of  the 
parasagittal  emission  slices  were filled  in  from  more 
complete sagittal transmission images. 
We next transformed  the PET  data to Talairach coor- 
dinates by deforming the 10 mm sagittal planes specified 
in the Talairach atlas until we obtained the best match 
(with “best”  being defined in a least-squares sense). This 
procedure allowed us to estimate the locations of  several 
key  structures, namely the frontal pole, occipital pole, 
vertex, AC, PC, and the tilt angle. Using the locations of 
the midsagittal plane and the key structures just  noted, 
we were able to compute the piece-wise linear transfor- 
mation to Talairach coordinates. We evaluated the quality 
of  this transformation  both by examining the standard 
errors of  the parameters and by visually comparing the 
manually drawn  brain surface to  the atlas contour. We 
also projected  a computerized version of  the 1967 Ta- 
lairach atlas onto the transformed data, which allowed 
us to confirm that the transformed image conformed to 
the outlines of  structures and key features in the atlas. 
We  specified the mean concentration in each slice for 
each run as an area-weighted sum, which was adjusted 
to a nominal value of  50 ml/min/100 g. The images were 
then scaled and smoothed with a two-dimensional Gaus- 
sian filter (20 mm wide, FWHM). We pooled the images 
over subjects for each testing condition, and a baseline 
image was  subtracted from a test  image; images were 
subtracted within subjects. The results were images of 
the mean differences, standard deviations, and a t-  value 
for each pixel. 
The PET  data analysis was different from that of  Ex- 
periment 1. The c statistic image was then submitted to 
a statistical parametric mapping (SPM) analysis, as devel- 
oped by  Friston, Frith, Liddle, and Frackowiak (1991). 
This procedure produced images of  standardized normal 
deviates, which are called “omnibus subtraction images.” 
To account for multiple comparisons and the spatial cor- 
relations in the image, we used  the SPM  technique to 
compute significance thresholds for specific hypotheses. 
This calculation depended on the image smoothness and 
the number of  pixels in each hypothesized region. We 
measured image smoothness in the way recommended 
by Friston et al. (1991) and found it to be 14.2 mm. We 
adjusted the threshold  for statistical significance to ac- 
count for multiple comparisons and the smoothness of 
subtraction  images (using Friston et  al.’s formula); the 
problem of  multiple comparisons occurs whenever there 
is  more  than  one resolution  element in  a  region  of 
interest  (ROI). The significance value was adjusted  by 
dividing it by the number of  pixels in the ROI. When we 
had predictions, one-tailed tests were used; when we did 
not have predictions, two-tailed tests were used. 
We  performed  two  different types of  analyses of  the 
data. First, ROIs  were defined to  test  specific a priori 
hypotheses.  Second,  the omnibus  subtraction  images 
were examined to observe post  hoc significance in  re- 
gions  that were not  hypothesized to  be  relevant;  the 
significance levels for these post hoc analyses were ad- 
justed based on the number of  comparisons (see Friston 
et al., 1991). One set of  ROI’s was added after the initial 
analysis, however, due to  an oversight: We  initially mis- 
classified the region of  the parietal  lobe that has been 
identified with the “disengage” operation (see Corbetta 
et al., in press). Because we predicted that the disengage 
operation  should be  used  when  one generates visual 
mental images, we felt justified in placing an ROI  over 
the superior parietal lobe after it was identified with this 
operation. In  fact, this area was sufficiently active to be 
detected by a post hoc test in all but one case. 
EXPERIMENT 3 METHOD 
Subjects 
Sixteen men volunteered to participate as paid subjects. 
The subjects’ mean age was 22 years, 10 months (range 
18;9-32;ll);  for the 13 “best” subjects, the mean age was 
22 years, 0 months (range 18;9-32;ll).  Most  of  the sub- 
jects were college or medical school students, and were 
recruited from several Universities in the Boston area. 
All subjects were right-handed and reported good eye- 
sight; none reported  that they were in poor health  or 
taking medication. None of  the subjects was aware of  the 
experimental hypotheses at the time of  testing. 
Materials 
The  stimuli  used  in  this  experiment  were tones  and 
words recorded  using a MacRecorder sound digitizing 
device, the SoundEdit program, and a Macintosh com- 
puter. The stimuli were presented  using  a customized 
version of  the MacLab program (Costin, 1988). The sub- 
jects heard the stimuli from two  AWA speakers, which 
were attached to the speaker port of  a Macintosh Plus 
computer. 
In  order to  encourage the subjects  to  visualize the 
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priate size, the subjects made one of  four possible judg- 
ments  about  each  letter. These  judgments  were  (1) 
whether the letter is composed solely of  straight (includ- 
ing diagonal) lines or whether it includes one or more 
curved lines, (2) whether the letter is left/right symmet- 
rical, (3) whether the letter has at least one straight (i.e., 
vertical or horizontal) line down the full length of  one 
of its four sides, and (4)  whether the letter has exactly 
two  terminators (end points that do not meet any other 
lines). Four  sets of  cue words were devised to  signal 
each type of  judgment; the words were: (1) “all straight,” 
(2) “symmetrical,”  (3) “straight side,” and (4)  “two ter- 
minators.” 
The  names of  all 26 letters of  the alphabet were pre- 
sented, and each cue appeared equally often. The correct 
response for each type  of  judgment was  equally often 
“yes” and “no,”  and no more than three trials in a row 
could  feature  the  same  judgment  or  response  type. 
Twenty letters were used for each type of judgment, and 
a given type of  judgment was performed no more than 
one time  for a given  letter; a total  of  80  trials were 
prepared. 
Two  sets of  16  practice  trials  also were  prepared, 
which  differed only in  the  order of  the  stimuli. The 
practice trials included the names of  numbers followed 
by the same four judgment cues used in the experimental 
trials. Each number from 0 through 9 was heard at least 
once during the practice trials. As in the actual test trials, 
the practice trials were balanced to include equal num- 
bers of  each of  the four judgments and equal numbers 
of  both responses for each. Two  versions of  the experi- 
ment were prepared, with the order of  trials being the 
only difference between them. The 80 trials of  the first 
version were divided in half, then each half was reversed, 
thus producing a second version. 
Task Procedure 
The  subjects were first  given written instructions that 
explained the four tasks; these judgments were illustrated 
using examples of  random figures that did and did not 
correspond to the criterion for each judgment. The  cue 
words for each of  the tasks were provided and subjects 
were instructed to learn them. The instructions strongly 
emphasized the importance of  keeping the eyes closed 
during the experiment, maintaining the mental image of 
the appropriate letter until hearing one of the four cues, 
responding as  quickly and accurately as possible after 
‘‘looking’’  at  the imaged letter, and imagining the letter 
at  the appropriate size for that set of  trials (they were 
told  that  this aspect  of  the experiment would be dis- 
cussed shortly). The  subjects were asked to paraphrase 
the instructions to ensure that they understood how to 
perform  each of  the  judgments  as well  as the  other 
critical  features of  the  experiment. The experimenter 
corrected the subject’s  understanding of  the instructions 
if necessary, and repeated a verbal summary of  the most 
important points. 
The subjects were then positioned on the scanner bed 
and again were reminded of the important features of 
the experiment. Before the first set of  practice trials, the 
subjects were told the size at  which letters should be 
imaged  during  the  set of  trials. They  either were  to 
visualize the letter at  a very large size or a very small 
size, depending on the counterbalancing group to which 
they belonged; half the subjects were instructed to imag- 
ine small letters for the first scan and large letters for 
the second scan, and vice versa for the other half of  the 
subjects. Prior to the “small” imagery block of  trials, the 
subjects were instructed to visualize the letter “as small 
as possible” in  the center of  their field of  view,  while 
still being able to distinguish all of  its parts. Prior to the 
‘‘large’’  imagery block, the subjects were instructed to 
visualize the letters so that “they fill up the entire field 
of  view,” while still being entirely visible in the image. 
The subjects began with the practice trials, and were 
told that they would be performing the appropriate tasks 
only on numbers (no letters). The beginning of  each trial 
was signaled by a 500-msec  tone, followed by a 500-msec 
delay, after which subjects heard the name of  a number. 
The subjects were to visualize (and maintain the image 
of) the appropriate digit at the indicated size. Four sec- 
onds later, a cue indicating one of  the four judgments 
was presented. The subjects were then to  evaluate the 
number for that property; if it was present they were to 
press the pedal under their right foot, and if  it was not 
present they were to  press the pedal under their  left 
foot. They were to respond as quickly and accurately as 
possible. Five hundred msec after the subject responded, 
a tone marked the beginning of  the next trial. 
The  test  trials  had  exactly the  same format  as the 
practice trials; the only difference was that the names of 
letters (and not numbers) were presented. Subjects be- 
gan the first block of  trials 30  sec before beginning to 
inhale I5O and continued for a total of  approximately 2 
min before they were instructed to stop. After  approxi- 
mately 5 min, subjects received instructions about the 
size at  which they were to visualize the  letters in  the 
following block of  trials, and then received the practice 
trials a second time (in a different order from the first 
set). The subjects were asked to form the images at the 
size not used during the first block of  trials, and were 
interviewed after the practice trials to discover whether 
they believed they had done so. The subjects began the 
second block of  trials 30  sec before the second inhala- 
tion, and again continued performing the task for about 
2 min before being instructed to stop. 
After  both sets of  trials were completed, the subjects 
were asked about the strategies they used to perform the 
tasks and asked whether they were able to maintain the 
images at the appropriate size for each block. All subjects 
reported  having  followed  the  instructions and having 
held the images at the correct size for at least half of  the 
~osslyn  et al.  285 trials in each block. The subjects were told the purpose 
and hypotheses of the experiment after this debriefing 
interview. 
PET Procedure and Data Analysis 
The PET procedure and data analyses were identical to 
those used  in Experiment 2. The ROIs  in area  17 (as 
specified  in the Talairach atlas)  were  selected on the 
right  side because of  Sergent’s (1989) earlier findings 
with a task that was similar to ours, and were positioned 
in the far posterior quarter of  the region and in the most 
anterior quarter of  the region. 
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